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I. INTRODUCTION

Transitional justice has become a mainstay in post-conflict recovery
and reconstruction. Since the 1970s, numerous countries have opted for
alternative justice mechanisms to respond to periods of massive violence
and human rights violations. The political openings that have made
peace processes possible have varied-peace accords (El Salvador and
Guatemala), moral weakening of militaries (Argentina), corruption
charges (Peru), and international pressure (South Africa).' Each of these
experiences presents its own nuances, demonstrating that no fixed transitional justice model exists.2 However, to date these various transitions
have shared a common trait: they occurred after episodes of internal
armed conflict, political violence, and authoritarian regimes. In each of
these settings, once political violence subsided, the governing power implemented transitional justice approaches to confront the past in the hope
of establishing the foundations for a different sort of future. Indeed, as
Ruti Teitel has argued, transitional justice is a leading rite of modem political passage and draws upon both legal innovations and ritual acts that
enable the passage between two orders-the predecessor and successor
regimes.'
By definition, transitional justice involves alternative approaches to
conventional justice, thus provoking lively and at times contentious
debate. In each context, political leaders, intellectuals, perpetrators,
victim-survivors, and other national and international actors struggle
over the balance between truth and justice, accountability and impunity, retribution and forgiveness, and material and symbolic reparations,
1.
See generally HERDING CATS: MULTIPARTY MEDIATION IN A COMPLEX WORLD
(Chester A. Crocker et al. eds., 1999) (discussing peacemaking efforts in the cases of El Salvador, Peru, and the South African region, among others); COMPARATIVE PEACE PROCESSES IN
LATIN AMERICA (Cynthia J. Amson ed., 1999) (examining the politics of peace negotiations
relating to guerrilla conflicts in Latin America).
2.
See PRISCILLA B. HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS: CONFRONTING STATE TERROR
AND ATROCITY (2001).

3.
See RUTI G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 11-26 (2000).
4.
The term "victim" and the elaboration of categories of victimization figure prominently in the work of truth commissions. In light of our work in Peru, we are more
comfortable with the hyphenation "victim-survivor" for several reasons. First, not all people
with whom we have spoken identify themselves as victims in their daily lives. Indeed, they
may reject the term for the helplessness it implies, choosing to distance themselves from such
an image. In Peru, for instance, those who suffered human rights violations use the term
"afectados" (affected). Second, part of our ongoing research focuses on the ways in which
people organize to demand reparations and how this political activism leads to new perceptions of citizenship and agency. Finally, we are influenced by the work of Mahmood Mamdani
and his assertion that people must move beyond dichotomized identities as one way of searching for new forms of justice and coexistence following atrocity. See MAHMOOD MAMDANI,
WHEN VICTIMS BECOME KILLERS: COLONIALISM, NATIVISM, AND THE GENOCIDE IN RWANDA

(2001).
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among other issues. As a result, new transitional justice experiences do
not evolve in a vacuum but rather are greatly shaped and influenced by
the experiences that came before them. Through this growing "popular
jurisprudence," new standards of acceptability and legal limits have
evolved to shape future transitional justice models.' Indeed, this evolving
body of legal principles is increasingly normative, as various social actors-particularly victim-survivors and their advocates, as well as
domestic and international human rights organizations-present absolute
human rights standards to limit political expediency. Thus, the exceptional nature of transitional justice and the flexible equations that have
been used to balance truth, justice, and reparations are becoming more
formulaic as justice increasingly trumps the use of amnesties and pardons in the name of "stability and order" during periods of volatile
political change.
Colombia is a case in point, and one that reflects this transitional justice genealogy. In July 2005 the country embarked on its own
transitional justice project when the Colombian Congress promulgated
Ley 975/05 (Law 975/05), the Ley de Justicia y Paz (Justice and Peace
Law). Unlike its predecessors, Colombia chose transitional justice
mechanisms pre-post-conflict: the country's internal armed conflict continues after years of failed peace negotiations and demobilization efforts
with various illegal armed groups. However, these latest negotiations occur within a different international context and legal climate, which in turn
shape the parameters of the legally and the socially possible. Indeed, prior
to the Justice and Peace Law, Colombia began a comprehensive Disarmament, Demobilization and Reinsertion (DDR) program, reforming
previous legal frameworks in an effort to collectively demobilize the paramilitaries. Previous attempts at demobilization in Colombia were
informed by military and security objectives, and were generally evaluated
in terms of technocratic concerns regarding the numbers of combatants
enrolled and arms surrendered.6 Embarking on a transitional justice process in the midst of war changes the nature of DDR, as well as the
objectives of transitional justice. Rather than operating in a sequential
5.
Orit Kamir, Honorand Dignity in the Film Unforgiven: Implicationsfor Sociolegal
Theory, 40 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 193, 211 (2006). Although the concept of "popular jurisprudence" is associated with mass consumption and the entertainment industry, we adopt the term
here in reference to the formation of popular notions of justice that develop in reaction to legal
and political processes occurring with relation to disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration and its related laws and negotiations.
6.
See Mark Knight & A. Ozerdem, Guns, Camps and Cash: Disarmament,Demobilization and Reinsertion of Former Combatants in Transitionsfrom War to Peace, 41 J. PEACE
RES. 499 (2004); Sami Faltas, DDR Without Camps: The Need for DecentralizedApproaches,
in BONN INT'L CTR. FOR CONVERSION (BICC), CONVERSION SURVEY 2005: GLOBAL DISARMAMENT, DEMILITARIZATION, AND DEMOBILIZATION 112 (2005).
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fashion, Law 975/05 shifted the DDR program onto the terrain of transitional justice and its concerns with issues of memory, truth, justice,
redress, and reconciliation. Simultaneously, by explicitly merging DDR
and transitional justice, Colombia draws upon the increasingly normative
field of transitional justice while contributing an innovative case study:
brokering peace through transitional justice mechanisms and staging a
transition in the absence of peace accords-indeed, in the midst of war.
This proposed approach has provoked intense domestic and international debate on the grounds that it requires compromising the
increasingly absolute human rights standards of truth, justice, and reparations with the desire to bring a warring faction to the negotiating table.
How much is the Colombian state willing and able to cede to the paramilitaries while still remaining faithful to international jurisprudence and
norms, as well as responding to the demands of a growing victimsurvivors' movement that is well-versed in the transitional justice thinking that has emerged over the last twenty-five years? The Colombian
victim-survivors' movement and the human rights organizations that
serve as their advocates have begun a contentious battle to revoke the
Justice and Peace Law through multiple judicial challenges, insisting on
victim-survivors' rights to truth, justice, and reparations-rights increasingly viewed as central to the broader goal of "national reconciliation."
The authors examine these legal challenges in order to explore how absolute human rights standards have come to influence the transitional
justice approach, which began as an alternative to these "rigid" principles. The authors propose that the legitimacy of transitional justice lies
precisely in the space in which local actors seek to balance legality with
politics, the demands of peace with the clamor for justice.
The authors of this Article were committed to researching the impact
of the paramilitary demobilization process "on the ground"-that is,
conducting qualitative research that would allow us to test the validity of
different debates with the goal of generating recommendations on how
future conflict and post-conflict countries might benefit from the merging of DDR and transitional justice.7 In this text we draw upon the
preliminary results of our research on the individual and collective demobilization programs. The first stage of the project included 112 indepth interviews with demobilized combatants from the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia-Ej rcito del Pueblo (FARC-EP)
(Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People's Army), the Ejjrcito
7.
For a fuller discussion of this research, see Kimberly Theidon & Paola Andrea
Betancourt, Transiciones Conflictivas: Combatientes Desmobilizados en Colombia, 58
ANALISIS POLfTICO 92 (2006), and Kimberly Theidon, Transitional Subjects: The Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Combatants in Colombia, INT'L J. TRANSITIONAL
JUST. (forthcoming Spring 2007).
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de Liberaci6n Nacional (ELN), and the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) (United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia).
We begin with a concise history of the current conflict in Colombia,
as well as previous demobilization efforts with various illegal armed
groups. We then turn to an analysis of the Justice and Peace Law, which
established the legal framework in which the DDR program is being implemented. Following a discussion of the debates this process has
generated, we present the findings from our qualitative research with
demobilized combatants. We conclude by examining the benefits and
challenges of moving DDR onto the terrain of transitional justice.
II. THE ORIGINS OF WAR

Colombia's civil war is the lengthiest armed conflict in the Western
hemisphere, beginning during the period known as La Violencia (19481953), when violent confrontation between two established political parties exploded. 9 The Conservative Party launched a violent offensive
against supporters of the Liberal and Communist parties, who were demanding socioeconomic and political change; these violent attacks
prompted the rural population to begin organizing "self-defense groups."
By the time La Violencia ended, 200,000 people were dead, and more than
a billion dollars in property damage had occurred. Ultimately, in 1958,
"democracy" was restored in Colombia when the Liberals and Conservatives issued the Declaration of Sitges, in which they proposed a
"National Front" of joint governance.10
Soon thereafter, in the 1960s, a proliferation of guerrilla movements
occurred in Colombia and throughout Latin America. In many cases, the
guerrilla movements were the armed wings of existing communist parties,
composed of those who felt traditional parties had failed to deliver on the
promise of social change and political reform." The FARC, Colombia's
8.
The ELN, formed in 1964, has its roots in the previous liberal peasant struggles,
and is thus an outgrowth of university unrest, with an estimated 3,500-4,000 combatants.
AMNESTY INT'L (AI), COLOMBIA, THE PARAMILITARIES IN MEDELLiN: DEMOBILIZATION OR
LEGALIZATION? 2 (2005). For more information on the various armed actors, see information
provided by the Center for International Policy, Colombia Program, available at http://
www.ciponline.org/colombia/infocombat.htm.
For a more detailed account of Colombia's history, see VIOLENCE IN COLOMBIA:
9.
THE CONTEMPORARY CRISIS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 81-84 (Charles Bergquist, Ricardo
Pefiaranda & Gonzalo Sinchez eds., 1992) (offering a political history of violence in Colombia from 1810 to 1990).
See TIMOTHY P. WICKHAM-CROWLEY, GUERRILLAS AND REVOLUTION IN LATIN
10.
AMERICA: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF INSURGENTS AND REGIMES SINCE 1956 17-18 (1992).
See Timothy P. Wickham-Crowley, Winners, Losers, and Also-Rans: Toward a
11.
Comparative Sociology of Latin American Guerrilla Movements, in POWER AND POPULAR
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oldest and largest guerrilla group, established itself in 1966.12 Today the
FARC has an estimated 18,000 members, including many women and
children.

The escalating insurgent violence prompted the formation of the alternately legal and illegal armed groups known collectively as
paramilitaries.' 3 State sponsorship of these groups traces back to Emergency Decree 3398, issued in 1965 and subsequently transformed into
Law 48 and approved by the Colombian Congress in 1968.1 This law
allowed the government to "mobilize the population in activities and
tasks" to restore public order and contain the insurgent threat." Specifically, the military formed armed civilian groups to assist in joint
counterinsurgency operations. Although promoted as "self-defense
committees" organized to protect local communities against the guerrillas, these groups came to assume greater responsibility in stateorganized "search and destroy" operations seeking to quash the guerrillas.1 6 This initiative arose out of the logic of the Cold War and a
counterinsurgency strategy that lay the groundwork for the paramilitaries
to become the preferred means of protecting the interests of the powerful
elite, suppressing social protest viewed through the prism of antiassisting in the expansion of drug trafficking
communism, and ultimately
7
throughout Colombia.'

Indeed, the growth of the paramilitaries occurred in the absence of a
state presence in war zones.' 8 Paramilitaries were often converted into
private security forces for rich landowners and economic elites who
wanted to remove peasants forcibly from land they later expropriated or

PROTEST: LATIN AMERICAN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 132, 133 (Susan Eckstein ed., 2001); WICKHAM-CROWLEY, supra note 10, at 30-33.
12.
Inter-Am. Comm'n on Human Rights (IACHR), Org. of Am. States (OAS), Third
Report on the Human Rights Situation in Colombia, 28, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. 102, Doc. 9 rev. 1
(1999) [hereinafter IACHR I], available at http://www.cidh.org/countryrep/Colom99en/table
%20of%20contents.htm; WICKHAM-CROWLEY, supra note 10, at 181.
13.
Winifred Tate, Paramilitariesin Colombia, 8 BROWN J. WORLD AFF. 163, 164
(2001-2002); see Fernando Cubides, Narcotrdficoy paramilitarismo:iMatrimonio indisoluble?, in EL PODER PARAMILITAR 215 (Alfredo Rangel ed., 2005).
14.
IACHR I, supra note 12, 1 17; Law No. 48 of Dec. 16, 1968, O.G. No. 32.679, Dec.
26, 1968 (Colom.), available at http://www.dafp.gov.co/leyes/L0048_68.HTM [hereinafter
Law No. 48].
15.
IACHR I, supra note 12, IN 36-37; Law No. 48, supra note 14.
16.
Al, supra note 8, at 3.
17.
Daniel Jaramillo Garcfa-Pefia, La relacidn del Estado colombiano con elfen6meno
paramillitar: Por el esclarecimiento hist6rico, 52 ANALISIS POLITICO 58 (2005) (author's
translation).
18.
Alfredo Rangel, iA Ddnde Van Los Paramilitares?,in EL PODER PARAMILITAR,
supra note 13, at 8, available at www.seguridadydemocracia.org/docs/pdf/ensayos/
prologoParamilitares.pdf.

Fall 20061

TransitionalJustice

developed.' 9 Multinational companies also played a role in contracting
paramilitary groups to protect their interests2 ° Increasingly, the paramilitaries became a means for resolving labor disputes, eliminating political
opponents, and controlling social protests by targeting activists and
peasant leaders-all actions that were brokered by the security forces
and framed as part of the counterinsurgency strategy.' The collaboration
between illegal armed groups and drug traffickers only further complicated the war.2 Into this already volatile situation, the U.S.-backed Plan
Colombia resulted in significant military support finding its way into the
hands of the AUC.23

Indeed, it was the fusion of paramilitary organizations and drug trafficking that ultimately gave rise to the phenomenon known as
paramilitarismo.By the late 1980s, the paramilitaries formed part of a
powerful parallel military structure "capable of coordinated action
throughout the country. 2 4 Yet, in light of growing outrage over the ties
between the military, paramilitaries, and drug traffickers-and the human rights violations attributed to these groups-then President Virgilio
Barco outlawed the use of armed civilians in army operations in a decree, noting that "these

provisions ...

may

be taken as

legal

authorization to organized armed civilian groups that end up acting outside the Constitution and the laws.., which stands in the way of pooling
efforts to achieve reconciliation ...

He also criminalized the promo-

tion, financing, and membership in paramilitary groups and penalized
19.
See NAZIH RICHANI, SYSTEMS OF VIOLENCE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF WAR
AND PEACE IN COLOMBIA 118 (2002).
20.
Nazih Richani, Multinational Corporations, Rentier Capitalism, and the War System in Colombia, 47.3 LATIN AM. POL. & SOC'Y 113 (2005).
21.
Al, supra note 8, at 4.
22.
See generally ROBIN KIRK, MORE TERRIBLE THAN DEATH: MASSACRES, DRUGS
AND AMERICA'S WAR IN COLOMBIA (2003) (discussing the political relationship between the
United States and Colombia including the drug war and the increasing U.S. military presence
in Colombia); Paul Collier, Rebellion as a Quasi-CriminalActivity, 44 J. CONFLICT RESOL.
839, 851-52 (2000); Mark Peceny & Michael Duman, The FARC's Best Friend: U.S. Antidrug
Policies and the Deepening of Colombia's Civil War in the 1990s, 48.2 LATIN AM. POL. &
SoC'Y 95 (2006) (providing examples of the connection between the conflict and the drug
war).
23.
Kimberly Theidon, PracticingPeace, Living With War: Going Upriver in Colombia
(2001), http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/01103001.htm. For an excellent overview of Plan
Colombia, see generally Ingrid Vaicius & Adam Isacson, The "War on Drugs" Meets the
"War on Terror" (2003), http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/0302ipr.htm (highlighting the
implications in Colombia from crossover between two U.S. political campaigns).
24.
Al, supra note 8, at 6.
25.
Decree No. 0815 of Apr. 19, 1989, O.G. No. 39116, Dec. 22, 1989 (Colom.) and
Decree No. 3398 of Dec. 24, 1965, O.G. No. 39116, Dec. 22, 1989 (Colom.), discussed in
IACHR, OAS, Report on The DemobilizationProcess in Colombia, 39, n.60, OEA/Ser.L/V/
11.120 Doc. 60 (Dec. 13, 2004) [hereinafter IACHR II], available at http://www.cidh.org/
countryrep/Colombia04eng/toc.htm.
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the act of training or equipping "persons in military tactics, techniques,
or procedures for undertaking criminal activities," making it an aggravated offense if done by active or retired members of the military forces
or National Police.26 However, in 1997, Carlos Castaflo brought together
eighteen paramilitary blocs to form the AUC as a national umbrella
group of paramilitaries. 27 The organization developed a highly regimented military command structure, seeking to translate its military
power and economic might into political capital.
Thus, legal reforms aside, paramilitarismocontinued. Domestic and
international human rights organizations have documented the continued
collusion between the military and paramilitary, resulting in massacres,
assassinations, torture, forced displacement, forced disappearances, and
kidnappings. Moreover, human rights organizations routinely attributed
seventy to eighty percent of the human rights violations to the paramili' 29
taries, making Colombia's armed conflict "a war against civil society.
What began forty-two years ago as a war waged by Marxist revolutionaries against an exclusive political system has devolved into a bloody
struggle over resources: the military, the paramilitaries, guerillas, domestic elites, and multinational actors vie for control of this resource-rich
country.3 ° In the struggle, all groups have committed serious human
rights violations, and according to Amnesty International, 70,000 people
have been killed in the past twenty years alone. 3'Thousands more have
disappeared or been kidnapped, tortured, and forcefully recruited by illegal armed groups, among other grave violations of fundamental rights 2
The vast majority of the war casualties are unarmed civilians, and the
escalating violence and fear have prompted massive internal and crossborder displacement.33 The UN High Commissioner for Refugees esti26.
Decree No. 1194 of July 15, 1992, O.G. No. 40.506, July 17, 1992 (Colom.), available at http://www.presidencia.gov.co/decretoslinea/1992/julio/15/dec 1194151992.doc.
27.
KIRK, supra note 22, at 173.
28.
See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (HRW), THE "SIXTH DIVISION": MILITARYPARAMILITARY TIES AND U.S. POLICY IN COLOMBIA (2001), available at http://www.hrw.org/
reports/2001/colombia/6theng.pdf; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE TIES THAT BIND: COLOMBIA
AND MILITARY-PARAMILITARY LINKS (2000), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/

colombia;

CAMILO ECHANDIA CASTILLA, EL CONFLICTO ARMADO Y LAS MANIFESTACIONES

DE VIOLENCIA EN LAS REGIONES DE COLOMBIA 65 (1999).
29.
DANIEL P9CAUT, GUERRA CONTRA LA SOCIEDAD 12 (2001).

30.
See the Washington Office on Latin America, http://www.wola.org/publications/
publications.htm and the Center for International Policy, http://ciponline.org/publications.htm,
http://www.cipcol.org for their ongoing position papers and blogs on US policy in the region;
KIRK, supra note 22, at xix; Hans R. Blumenthal, Uniendo Esfuerzos por Colombia, PAPELES
DE CUESTIONES INTERNACIONALES 79, 80 (Winter 2000).
31.
Al, supra note 8, at 2.
32.
Id. at 3.
33.
Gonzalo Sd.nchez G., Introduction: Problems of Violence, Prospectsfor Peace, in
VIOLENCE IN COLOMBIA, 1990-2001: WAGING WAR AND NEGOTIATING PEACE 23 (Charles
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mates that almost three million people have been internally displaced. 4
Often, the most vulnerable sectors of society have been targeted, including disproportionate numbers of indigenous people and members of
Afro-Colombian communities.35 In sum, the war in Colombia has resulted in a humanitarian crisis provoking international concern, as
and demvarious armed groups commit serious human rights violations
36
law.
humanitarian
international
for
onstrate total disregard
III.

DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION, AND REINTEGRATION:
COLOMBIA'S SERIAL SEARCH FOR PEACE

During Colombia's forty-two-year internal armed conflict, each successive president has attempted some sort of military victory or, in the
face of that impossibility, peace negotiations. While it is beyond the
scope of this text to present an exhaustive review of these previous efforts, we note certain key features that serve to contextualize current
peace negotiations and explain the tensions between traditional models
of demobilization and a changing political and legal context.
Within the glossary of post-conflict reconstruction and peace building, three terms loom large: disarmament, demobilization, and
reintegration. As the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) defines it, in the context of peace processes,
"disarmament" consists of the collection, control, and elimination of
small arms, ammunition, explosives, and light and heavy weapons from
the combatants and, depending upon the circumstances, the civilian
population.37 "Demobilization" is the process in which armed organizations (which may consist of government or opposition forces, or simply
armed factions) decrease in size or are dismantled as one component of a
broad transformation from a state of war to a state of peace that may involve the concentration, quartering, disarming, management, and
licensing of former combatants with the incentive of compensation or
Bergquist, Ricardo Pefiaranda & Gonzalo Sdnchez G. eds., 2001); for a discussion of internal
forced displacement, see ALFREDO MOLANO, THE DISPOSSESSED: CHRONICLES OF THE DESTERRADOS OF COLOMBIA 203 (2005).
34.
U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees (UNHCR), Colombia Situation Map (Jan. 2006),
available at http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/publ/opendoc.pdf?tbl=PUBL&id--44103
c150.
IACHR II, supra note 25, 45; see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, YOU'LL LEARN
35.
NOT TO CRY: CHILD COMBATANTS IN COLOMBIA (2003) (discussing the vulnerability of children in Colombia's conflict).
IACHR II, supra note 25, 1 2.
36.
37.
U.N. DEP'T OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION AND
REINTEGRATION OF EX-COMBATANTS
GUIDELINES

IN A PEACEKEEPING ENVIRONMENT: PRINCIPLES AND

15 (1999), availableat http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/lessonsADD&R.pdf.
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other assistance to reenter civilian life. Finally, "reinsertion" or "reintegration" directs ex-combatants to strengthen their capacity, and that of
their families, to achieve social and economic self-sufficiency. 8 Reinsertion programs may include economic assistance, technical or
professional training, or instruction in other productive activities.
In sum,
39
"DDR is concerned with dismantling the machinery of war."
In its traditional formulation and implementation, DDR was squarely
located within a military or security framework. 4 This focus failed to
give sufficient consideration to the host communities and the need to
incorporate local, cultural, or gendered conceptions of what constitutes
the rehabilitation and resocialization of ex-combatants. Yet, an evaluation of DDR programs in sub-Saharan Africa noted that "[1]ong-term
integration is ultimately the yardstick by which the success of the DDR
programme is measured."4 ' Reintegration therefore appears to be the
weakest phase of the DDR process. The newly released United Nations
Integrated DDR Standards underscores the deficiency of reintegration
efforts and insists on "the need for measures to be conducted in consultation and collaboration with all members of the community and
stakeholders engaged in the community, and [DDR programs] make use
of locally-appropriate development incentives.4 2
Even if DDR has tended to be defined as a military strategy, its importance in human rights contexts has not gone unnoticed. For instance,
the UN Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights
through Action to Combat Impunity (the Joinet Principles) establish that
"[g]uarantees of non-recurrence" include "measures to disband parastatal armed groups.4 3 In the report to which the principles are annexed, the
Special Rapporteur states, "[d]isbandment of parastatal armed groups:
this is one of the hardest measures to enforce ...[because], if not ac-

companied by action to reintegrate group members into society, the cure
may be worse than the disease.4" To that end, Joinet Principle 38 addresses the "Disbandment of unofficial armed groups directly or
38.
39.
40.
41.
AFRICA

Id.
Faltas, supra note 6, at 2.
Id. at 5; see also Knight & Ozerdem, supra note 6, at 499.
NAT J. COLLETTA ET AL., THE TRANSITION FROM WAR TO PEACE IN SUB-SAHARAN

18 (1996).

42.
Quaker United Nations Office, Taking a Step Forward at the UN Review Conference: Supporting the ParagraphsRelated to Demand in the Draft Outcome Document (May
18, 2006), http://www.quno.org/disarmament/salw/SmallArms2006/DemandSB2.pdf.
43.
U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm. on Prevention of Discrimination & Prot. of Minorities, Final Report on the Question of the Impunity of Perpetratorsof
Human Rights Violations (civil and political), annex H, princ. 37, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/
1997/20 Rev. 1 (Oct. 2, 1997) (prepared by Louis Joinet, U.N. Special Rapporteur on Impunity) [hereinafter Joinet Principles].
44.
Id. 143.
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indirectly linked to the State and of private groups benefiting from its
passivity. '45 This directive reflects the principle of prevention and non-

repetition, the underlying justification for the international human rights
protection system. 6 In this vein, the Inter-Ameican Commission on
Human Rights (IACHR) advised that "[t]he efforts at peacemaking and
demobilization of armed groups should be strengthened on the basis of
legitimacy and participation, so as to offer the beneficiaries a genuine
opportunity for reintegration into society and guarantees of protection in
the face of possible violent reprisals. 47 Indeed, as will be explored, Colombia's experience suggests that the traditionally slighted issue of
reintegration may serve as the bridge to the goals of transitional justice,
in particular reconciliation.
A. The Start of DDR in Colombia: Negotiating
Peace with Guerrillas
An overview of past DDR efforts in Colombia highlights the weaknesses in the traditional DDR framework in terms of the reintegration
phase, ultimately resulting in backslides to violence. Most approaches
adopted the logic of olvido y perd6n en pro de la paz (forgetting and
pardon in favor of peace). For instance, in 1953, Army Chief of Staff
General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla staged a coup to end La Violencia, initiating Colombia's first demobilization effort through general amnesty and
government aid to belligerents who lay down their arms. 48 Thousands
complied with the offer, and relative calm ensued for several months following the coup. The government failed to provide adequate security,
however, and many of the demobilized men were subsequently killed in
an escalating cycle of revenge. 49
Since then, numerous administrations have attempted to implement
DDR with various guerrilla groups. Early demobilization efforts
illustrate the extent to which absolute amnesty was considered a
legitimate means of securing "peace." The Betancour administration
(1982-1986) applied Law 35, Ley de Amnistia no condicionaday en pro
de la Paz (Law of Unconditional Amnesty in Favor of Peace) to
recognize the guerrilla organizations as political actors, thereby
45.
Id. annex II, princ. 38.
46.
See Lisa J. Laplante, Bringing Effective Remedies Home: The Inter-American Human Rights System, Reparations and the Duty of Prevention, 22 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 347,
347-61 (2004).
47.
IACHR II, supra note 25, 100.
48.
See Gonzalo Snchez, The Violence: An Interpretive Synthesis, in VIOLENCE IN
COLOMBIA: THE CONTEMPORARY CRISIS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 9, at 10204.
49.
For an interesting history of guerrilla politics in Colombia, see STEVEN DUDLEY,
WALKING GHOSTS: MURDER AND GUERRILLA POLITICS IN COLOMBIA 19, 28 (2006).
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establishing a framework for demobilization efforts not connected to a
peace treaty.50 Nearly 700 guerrilla members from the FARC, ELN, and
the Movimiento 19 de Abril (M-19) participated in this demobilization
program.5 Law 35 also formed the basis for the Uribe Contract of 1984,
in which the FARC agreed to a ceasefire and announced the
52
Following their
establishment of a political party, the Uni6n Patri~tica.
demobilization and reconstitution as a legitimate political party, some
3,000 members of the Uni6n Patri6tica were assassinated by
paramilitaries who had not been included in peace talks. The failure to
guarantee security for the ex-combatants-and their subsequent
slaughter-hovers over any negotiations with the guerrilla groups today.
The Barco government (1986-1990) also attempted to demobilize
the guerrillas via the Iniciativapara la Paz (Initiative for Peace), requiring the guerrillas to dismantle their military apparatus, surrender their
weapons, and reintegrate into society. 3 This effort emphasized a national
reconciliation process, yet still excluded the paramilitaries. The continued paramilitary violence, often carried out with the tacit support of the
military, undermined the peace process. Moreover, the initiative did not
contemplate concerted reintegration programs, although the first National Reintegration Office finally opened in April 1991. Among the
problems plaguing the process were insufficient funding, scant monitoring of the demobilized combatants, and lack of consultation with or
benefits to the host communities 4 In sum, the government's main goal
was ending the armed conflict, and little thought was directed toward
how to move beyond winning the war to securing peace.
The succession of failed attempts continued, with Cesar Gavirfa
(1990-1994) attempting to control drug trafficking through pleabargaining and reduced sentences for drug kingpins who turned themselves in to authorities. With attention focused on the key drug
traffickers, other armed groups grew virtually unchecked. The paramilitaries expanded as allies in the struggle to provide "security" in those
areas of the country where the state was historically absent, and as their
50.
Law No. 35 of Nov. 19, 1982, O.G. No. 36133, Nov. 20, 1982 (Colom.).
51.
M-19 formed after the allegedly fraudulent presidential elections of April 19, 1970.
An urban group, its ideology was a blend of populism and nationalistic revolutionary socialism. IACHR II, supra note 25, 42; MARKUS KOTH, BONN INT'L CTR. FOR CONVERSION
(BICC), To
LOMBIA

52.

END A WAR: DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION OF PARAMILITARIES IN CO-

13 (2005), availableat http://www.bicc.de/publications/papers/paper43/paper43.pdf.
For an excellent discussion of the Uni6n Patri6tica, see DUDLEY, supra note 49, at

77-88.
53.
Garcfa-Pefia, supra note 17, at 60.
54.
Al, supra note 8, at 43. For the most complete overview of this process and the
other DDR programs that ultimately failed during the 1980s and 1990s, see ALVARO VILLARRAGA,

LA REINSERCI6N EN COLOMBIA: EXPERIENCIAS,

PUBLICA

(2006).
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power grew, so did the lethality of their methods. Thus, by the time
President Ernesto Samper (1994-1998) was elected, the paramilitaries
were increasingly viewed as a threat to the state; in consolidating their
territorial and political power, they increasingly turned their violence on
members of the elite who had been their allies and benefactors.
Additionally, ongoing definitional debates revolved around which
groups would be considered political and which would be labeled terrorist. Law 418 in 1997 opened the possibility that the government could
bestow cardcterpolitico (political status) on guerrilla groups and popular militias, thus making negotiations possible. 6 The law also established
an exploratory commission charged with determining the possibility of
entering into dialogue with the guerrillas and presenting "recommendations regarding the treatment that ... would need to be given to the self-

defense groups as parties to the armed conflict.5 7 For the first time, the
issue of paramilitary groups was included in the government's efforts to
develop peace policies.
These initial steps toward full inclusion did not last long. Andr6s
Pastrana (1998-2002) was elected president on a platform that promised
renewed peace talks and a commitment to achieving a negotiated settlement to the war. In an effort to demonstrate to the guerrillas that he was
a man of his word, he ceded to the FARC a large portion of southern
Colombia to which military access would be denied, thereby ensuring
the guerrillas a "safe zone" during the peace process. 58 However, this
controversial move did not succeed in securing meaningful negotiations,
and once again, the paramilitaries remained strikingly absent from the
negotiating table.
B. Negotiating Peace with Paramilitaries:
ContemporaryDDR Efforts

In the wake of so many failed peace processes, President Alvaro Uribe
(2002-2006; 2006-present) was elected on the promise of restoring security and the rule of law. With the failure of Pastrana still fresh, Uribe
refused to negotiate with the FARC, whom he considered a "terrorist

55.
See Luis Alberto Restrepo M., The Equivocal Dimensions of Human Rights in Colombia, in VIOLENCE IN COLOMBIA, 1990-2001: WAGING WAR AND NEGOTIATING PEACE,
supra note 33, at 100-101.
56.
Law No. 418 of Dec. 26, 1997, O.G. No. 43.201, Dec. 26, 1997 (Colom.).
57.
ALTO COMISIONADO PARA LA PAZ [OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM'R FOR PEACE OF
COLOM.], CONSTRUIR

LA PAZ DE MARANA: UNA ESTRATEGIA

PARA LA RECONCILIACI6N

(1997) (author's translation).
58.
See David Bushnell, Politics and Violence in Nineteenth-Century Colombia, in
VIOLENCE IN COLOMBIA: THE CONTEMPORARY CRISIS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, supra
note 9, at 24-25.
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threat. '59 Rather, he cautiously explored the possibility of negotiating
with the paramilitaries, while simultaneously promising to rein in the
guerrillas.
There is a certain irony to these negotiations: in part the paramilitary
demobilization is an attempt to "de-paramilitarize" the Colombian state,
distancing it from these "self-defense committees," that went beyond
governmental control. In its report on Colombia's demobilization, Amnesty International notes that "[t]he notion of a peace or demobilization
process between the government and paramilitaries is a seemingly contradictory concept given the long-standing and close links between the
security forces and paramilitaries, and the fact that the raison d'etre of
paramilitarism is the defense of the Colombian state and the status quo
against real or perceived threats."' Yet certain sectors of the Colombian
military also felt that the paramilitaries damaged the legitimacy of the
institution itself and were thus eager to distance themselves from a group
that had become a liability.6 ' Furthermore, increasing domestic and international pressure called for a more permanent solution.
The paramilitary leaders had their own motivations for engaging in
dialogue. Alfredo Rangel has persuasively argued that paramilitary leaders entered into negotiations with Uribe for four key reasons. 62 First,
many paramilitary leaders were tired of combat. Many of these men are
accustomed to urban life and its comforts, and life in the rural war zones
is not only harsh but keeps them away from their families. Second, many
paramilitary leaders expected the Uribe administration to weaken and
beat back the guerrillas, which would deprive them of the discourse that
justified their existence. Third, they assumed that the legal and political
conditions for their demobilization and reinsertion would resemble those
that previous administrations had extended to the guerrillas during the
1980s and 1990s. Finally, national and international sentiment was
strongly behind Uribe's efforts to negotiate a demobilization process
with the paramilitaries.
However, as we argue throughout this text, the paramilitary leaders
were mistaken in several of their assumptions. Principally, they did not
consider the substantial changes that have occurred in international human rights law and norms, and the increasing demand for truth, justice,
and reparations following armed conflicts. Thus, rather than the wellworn path of pardon and forgetting, these paramilitary leaders entered

59.
60.
61.
62.

supra note 22, at 279-80.
Al, supra note 8, at 11.
Id.at 6.
Rangel, supra note 18, at 4.
KIRK,

Fall 2006]

TransitionalJustice

into negotiations that were strongly influenced by demands for nunca
mds (never again).
Within this shifting context, Uribe became the first Colombian
president to enter into a peace process with the AUC. This innovation set
Uribe's peace policy apart from that of every other administration since
1989, when President Barco declared the paramilitary groups illegal. As
Garcia Pefia observes, "[w]ith this, the analytical frame changes radically: it was always thought that the paramilitary demobilization would
be the result of peace with the insurgency--either simultaneously or
subsequently-because the
paramilitaries themselves claim to be a con' 63
sequence of the guerrilla.
In August 2002, the government began negotiations with the paramilitaries, facilitating this process through Law 782 of December 2002,
which regulated individual and collective demobilization efforts by both
extending and amending Law 418 of 1997. 64 The government named
Luis Carlos Restrepo as the High Commissioner for Peace responsible
for promoting the signing of the Santa Fe de Ralito I agreement on July
15, 2003. The agreement marked the beginning of formal talks between
the AUC-linked paramilitary groups and the government, and it included
terms for the demobilization of all paramilitary combatants by the end of
2005.65 The AUC was obliged to suspend its lethal activities and maintain
the unilateral ceasefire, as well as aid the government in its anti-drugtrafficking efforts.66 As talks began, the AUC announced a unilateral
ceasefire on December 1, 2002, while insisting that none of its members
would face prison time or extradition to the United States. 6' The Santa Fe
de Ralito II agreement, signed on May 13, 2004, set up a 368-squarekilometer zona de ubicaci6n (concentration zone) in Tierralta, C6rdoba,
63.
Garcfa-Pefia, supra note 17, at 66.
64.
See Law 782 of Dec. 23, 2002, O.G. No. 45.043, Dec. 23, 2002. In January 2003,
the government adopted Decree 128, infra note 71, which regulates Law 418 of 1997, on returning to civilian life.
65.
Al, supra note 8, at 11-12.
66.
Id.
67.
Colombia Law 975 prohibits extradition of members of illegal armed groups accused of "political" offenses such as rebellion and sedition. It does permit extradition for
offenses such as drug-trafficking. See infra text accompanying note 227. Some have speculated that the paramilitaries have recently shown more interest in negotiations due to the threat
of extradition to the United States on drug charges. HRW, COLOMBIA: LETTING PARAMILITARIES OFF THE HOOK 3 (2005), available at http://hrw.org/backgrounder/americas/
colombia0105; Juan Forero, Colombia Proposes 10-Year Terms for ParamilitaryAtrocities,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2004, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/l 1/16/international/
americas/16colombia.html; see e.g., Press Release, U.S. Attorney, S. Dist. N.Y., US Indicts
Leaders of Colombian Terrorist Organization on Narcotic Trafficking Charges (July 22, 2004)
(making reference to the proceedings against Diego Fernando Murillo, alias Adolfo Paz or
"Don Berna,' and Vicente Castahio Gil, alias "El Profe," both members of the negotiating high

command of the AUC).
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to facilitate and consolidate the negotiation process between the government and the AUC, improve verification of the ceasefire, and
establish a timetable for demobilization. 6 However, while the military
and national police are responsible for guarding the perimeter of the
zone, they have no presence within it, leaving civilians inside the zone in
a state of insecurity. 69
Decree 128, promulgated on January 22, 2003, regulates Law 782
and thus governs both the individual and collective demobilization processes. 70 The Decree established the Comite Operativo para la Dejaci6n
de Armas (Committee for Laying Down Arms) to verify membership in
illegal armed groups and to evaluate whether individuals and groups
have a genuine desire to demobilize and provide identification papers to
certify their status. Decree 128 provides economic and legal benefitsincluding "pardons, conditional suspension of the execution of a sentence, a cessation of procedure, a resolution of preclusion of the
investigation or a resolution of dismissal"-to armed groups that committed "political and related crimes.,, 7' These groups also enjoy
immunity from future prosecution for the same crimes underlying the
benefits granted. Finally, Decree 128 regulates social benefits, such as
the provision of food, shelter, safety, and even economic opportunities.
The complete process takes a maximum of forty-eight days, beginning with the paramilitary leaders giving the government a list of their
members and the weapons they will surrender. Following this stage, the
members are moved to a "concentration zone" where their identities are
verified through fingerprints, photographs, and dental records for the RegistraduriaNacional del Estado Civil (National Registrar of Civil Status).72
These individuals also hand over their weapons and are checked for outstanding arrest warrants for crimes not covered by Decree 128, based on
68.
AI, supra note 8, at 14. This agreement was implemented through Resolution 092
of 2004 (Colom.). IACHR II, supra note 25, exec. summary, 10.
69.
Ceding the concentration zone to the AUC has caused some to question whether
President Uribe is headed toward his own "Caguancito" (little Cagud.n), referring to the zone
Pastrana ceded to the FARC during his failed negotiations of 1998-2002. Indeed, when Uribe
authorized preliminary talks with the AUC leadership, he assured at least one of the Catholic
priests accompanying the negotiations that he did not want a repeat of Cagudn. Interview with
representative of the Catholic Church, in Apartad6, Colom. (Sept. 6, 2005).
70.
In this text we focus on the collective demobilization of the paramilitaries. However, under the presidency of Alvaro Uribe more than 6,000 members of the FARC, the ELN
and the AUC have individually demobilized. For more information, see OFFICE OF THE HIGH
COMM'R FOR PEACE OF COLOM., Cuadrs Resumen, Areas Despejadas 2003-2006 31.671
DESMOVILIZADOs, available at www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/desmovilizaciones/
2004/indexresumen.htm (last visited Feb. 19, 2007).
71.
Decree No. 128 of Jan. 22, 2003, art. 13, O.G.No.45.073, Jan. 24, 2003 (Colom.),
available at http://www.dafp.gov.co/leyes/D0128003.HTM.
72.
HRW, supra note 67, at 7, n.20 (citing OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM'R FOR PEACE OF
COLOM., REPORT OF THE GENERAL RAPPORTEUR, section 3.6 D).
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the Office of the Attorney General's database, as well as those of the
state intelligence services.
When an individual is transferred to the zone, the government determines whether he or she is responsible for a human rights violation.
While this determination should be based on information provided by
the Attorney General's office along with information from the state intelligence branch,73 the Attorney General's office apparently conducts only
a cursory check of its files to see if the individual is already the subject
of an ongoing prosecution or has been previously convicted. 74 Thus, no
new prosecutions arise during the demobilization process unless and until crimes are discovered at a later time. Finally, if an individual is
suspected of being a human rights violator-irrespective of whether the
acts in question were political-he is not eligible for Decree 128 and
remains in the concentration zone after the remainder of the group is
returned to the place of origin.75 Those who return begin to receive economic benefits and other support, and any criminal charge or
investigation terminates. None of those subject to this process is required
to identify illegally obtained assets or provide reparations to victims.
In practice, flaws in this system have resulted in pardons for paramilitary members under investigation for non-pardonable offenses such
as human rights violations. In December 2004, the Office of the General
Prosecutor, the government entity responsible for disciplinary investigations of public officials and security force members charged with
misconduct and human rights violations, revealed that 160 members of
the paramilitary group Bloque Cacique Nutibara (BCN) were pardoned
under Decree 128 but were later found to be under investigation for human rights violations.76 While a handful of members and many
paramilitary leaders have been sent to the concentration zone, many
other demobilized paramilitaries who benefited from Decree 128 have
therefore gone free, often returning to their communities of origin.77 The
Colombian Procuraduria(Inspector General's Office) found that 163
individuals charged with atrocities such as kidnapping and forced disappearances had received judicial benefits.78

73.
Id. at 7.
74.
Id. at 8.
75.
Decree No. 128 of Jan. 22, 2003, art. 21, O.G. No. 45.073; see also HRW, supra
note 67, at 8, n.22.
76.
Al, supra note 8, at 13.
77.
Technically, those who come under later investigation for human rights violations
lose the Decree 128 benefits and would then be subject to the Law 975 benefits, including an
extraordinary justice route. Id.
78.
Procuradurfa General de la Naci6n (Inspector General's Office), Comisidn especial
de la Procuraduria vigila proceso de desmovilizaci6n de AUC en accifn preventiva,
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C. Problems with Colombia'sDDR. The Question of Accountability
Since 2003, Colombians have watched orchestrated ceremonies of
paramilitaries laying down their arms before television audiences and
dignitaries in efforts to demobilize. The process commenced on November 25, 2003, when 874 members of the BCN laid down their arms,
setting off a series of large-scale demobilizations.7 9 To date, a total of
30,151 AUC combatants have demobilized, and 16,983 weapons have
been turned in and registered.8 0 Despite the media-friendly performance
of demobilization, the reality reveals the difficulties and superficialities
of such efforts.
While the Ministry of Defense claimed significant reductions in the
violence beginning in 2003, other sources showed that sociopolitical
violence remained high, with almost 5,000 extrajudicial killings in 2003,
the majority executed by paramilitaries.82 The Centro de Investigaci6n y
Educaci6n Popular (Research and Public Education Center) has also
identified increases in displacement due to the violence.83 The Colombian Defensorfa del Pueblo (Ombudsman's office) reported in
September 2004 that it had received 342 complaints against paramilitaries, including massacres, assassinations, and kidnappings.84 That same
408, Dec. 10, 2004, available at http://www.procuraduria.gov.co/html/noticias2004/ noticias_408.htm.
Al, supra note 8, at 1; OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM'R FOR PEACE OF COLOM.,
79.
REPORT
OF COLLECTIVE
DEMOBILIZATION
(2004), available at http://
UPDATE
www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/desmovilizaciones/2004/balance.htm; HRW, COLOMBIA,
LIBRANDO A LOS PARAMILITARES DE SUS RESPONSABILIDADES n. 25 (2005) (citing Solamente se
Desmovilizaron 5 de los 11 Bloques de Autodefensa que Debian Hacerlo, EL TIEMPO (Colom.),
Dec. 13, 2004, available at http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/americas/colombia0105-sp/
BOLETfN

index.htm).

80.

OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM'R FOR PEACE OF COLOMBIA,

supra note 70, figs. 2, 3,

available at http://www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/desmovilizaciones/2004/indexresu

men.htm. The UN Commission on Human Rights refers to official information stating that
from late 2003 through December 2005, approximately 14,000 people had been collectively
demobilized in twenty-three ceremonies. ECOSOC, U.N. Comm'n on Human Rights, Report
of the High Commissionerfor Human Rights on the situation of human rights in Colombia,
70, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/009 (Jan. 20, 2006) [hereinafter UNCHR Report].
81.
MINISTRY OF DEF. OF THE REPUBLIC OF COLOM., INFORME ANUAL DE DERECHOS
HUMANOS Y DERECHO INTERNACIONAL HUMANITARIO 2002 Y AVANCES PERiODO PRESIDENCIAL [2002 ANNUAL REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
AND PERIODIC PRESIDENTIAL ADVANCES] 167 (2003).

82.
Centro de Investigaci6n y Fducaci6n Popular (CINEP) & Justicia y Paz, Cifras de
la violencia politica enero-diciembre de 2003 [Figures on Political Violence, JanuaryDecember 2003], 28 NOCHE Y NIEBLA 31 (2003); CINEP & Justicia y Paz, Los Derechos
Fundamentalesen el 2003 [FundamentalRights in 2003], 28 NOCHE Y NIEBLA 27 (2003).
83.
CINEP, Cifras de la violencia politica enero-junio de 2005 [Figures on Political
Violence January-June2005], 31 NOCHE Y NIEBLA 21, 21 this. 1, 2 (2005).
84.
Defensorfa del Pueblo de Colombia, Seguimiento al Cese de HostilidadesPrometido por las Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia como Signo de su Voluntad de Paz para el Pais,
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year, the Colombian Commission of Jurists reported 1,899 disappearances from the date of the ceasefire."5 Similarly, while the Ministry of
Defense has reported that twenty percent of the paramilitary combatants
have demobilized, others claim that the number of paramilitaries has
grown by ten percent annually. 6 In 2004, the IACHR observed that the
process had neither resulted in a significant reduction of violence nor
altered the threatening and abusive behavior of local paramilitaries. 8" In
other words, despite televised collective demobilizations, the general
population continued to live in a climate of fear and violence. Critics
blame the mechanisms used for the physical demobilization of paramili18
tary troops and the lack of oversight of the process.
In particular, Decree 128 affects individual demobilization but does
not adequately address collective demobilization. Thus, the structure of
paramilitarism is not dismantled, even though individual combatants disarm and demobilize. Importantly, collective demobilization is "identified
with the development of peace negotiations with the leadership of illegal
organizations," whereas "individual demobilizations seek to dismantle
these organizations from their base, offering their members the opportunity to avail themselves of procedural, social, and economic benefits in
exchange for their surrender and cooperation with the authorities." 8' 9
Since the passage of Law 418 of 1997, the tenor of demobilization efforts has been to encourage individuals to desert illegal armed groups. Yet,
Decree 128 does not require individuals to provide information about the
group to which they belong, leaving some information about crimes uncovered. 90 The demobilization procedures follow what Human Rights
Watch terms "an assembly line approach," which adheres to mechanical
procedures in accordance with an expedited schedule mandated by the
High Commissioner for Peace. 9' Investigators lose valuable information
about the group's structures, crimes, financing, illegal assets, and other
critical information. The differences in the means may therefore reflect
available at http://www.defensoria.org.co/pdf/informes
2004, at 23,
Sept. 24,
informe_107.pdf.
Comisi6n Colombiana de Juristas, El deber de la memoria: imprescindible para
85.
superar la crisis de derechos humanos y derecho humanitario en Colombia 2004, at 13
(2004), available at http://www.coljuristas.org/documentos/documentos-pag/DEBER%20
MEMORIA%20FINAL.pdf.
IACHR II, supra note 25, 78.
86.

87.

Id.

96-97.

Al, supra note 8, at 43.
88.
IACHR II, supra note 25, 72.
89.
See Decree No. 128 of Jan. 22, 2003, art. 13, O.G.No. 45.073, Jan. 24, 2003 (Co90.
torn.), available at http://www.dafp.gov.co/leyes/DO128003.HTM.
HRW, supra note 67, at 7. See Office of the High Comm'r for Peace of Colorn.,
91.
Schedule of Demobilization (Nov. 3, 2003), http://www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/
noticias/2004/noviembre/nov_03_04b.htm.
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differences in the desired ends. Andres Pefiate, the Colombian Deputy
Secretary of Defense, has affirmed that the "demobilization of individuals is regarded as a 'war tactic' by the government, as its emphasis is on
the retrieval of information and the weakening of the insurgent groups,
[while] 'collective demobilization' is conceived as a peace instrument. 92
Moreover, with so many ex-paramilitaries free without consequences
and paramilitarismointact, new problems complicate the peace process.
One arises when paramilitaries undergo a "legitimization" process,
which entails the purchase of legal businesses and other productive pro93

jects, as well as integration into local, regional, and national politics.

Paramilitaries often gain control of these assets or positions through cooptation or threats, and thus they have maintained a widespread societal
presence, occupying "a significant number of local mayors' offices, governorships, the judicial apparatus, the health and education system,
public contracts, business cooperatives and other economic concerns,
private security firms, and the criminal economy, including drugtrafficking, extortion, the illegal trade in gasoline, prostitution, and gam94
bling rackets, thus part of a complex criminal organization.
Meanwhile, those living in the community, labeled comunas, continue to
live under "the reign of silence." 95 As Human Rights Watch cautions,
"unless the law takes into account the complexity, power, and regenerative capacity of paramilitary mafias, there is a serious risk that the
demobilization process will simply give paramilitary leaders the benefits
they seek without resulting in any real advances in terms of accountability or peace. ' 96 Any reengagement of demobilized combatants in the
conflict therefore contributes
to the failure to "break the cycle of vio97
Colombia."
in
lence
Without a breakdown of paramilitarismo,both demobilized paramilitaries and guerrillas are being "recycled" into the conflict, often as
paid military informants, and thus "legalized" to become "more palatable to domestic and international public opinion." 98 Moreover, they gain
economic and legal benefits while continuing with their illegal activities.
92.

KOTH, supra note 51, at 26.
93.
Al, supra note 8, at 10.
94.
Id.
95.
IACHR II, supra note 25, 82.
96.
HRW, supra note 67, at 1.
97.
IACHR II, supra note 25, exec. summary, T 3.
98.
Al, supra note 8, at 49. For instance, the Ministry of Defense adopted Decree 2767
on August 31, 2004, expanding the regime of economic benefits already established in Decree
128 to include persons who collaborate with military forces and the National Police by providing more information on the activities of illegal groups. This arrangement was considered a
way "to offer them an opportunity to develop a life plan safely and with dignity." Decree 2767
of Aug. 31, 2004, pmbl., O.G. No. 45657, Aug. 31, 2004 (Colom.), available at http://
www.presidencia.gov.co/prensa-new/decretoslinea/2004/agosto/3 I/dec2767310804.pdf.
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In this way, paramilitarismobecomes "reengineered" rather than dismantled. As the IACHR recognizes, fostering conditions for the
successful reincorporation to society of those who have formalized their
intent to put down their arms is valid and desirable. At the same time, the
use of civilians in tasks to support the military forces and National Police must be evaluated with caution since it could reproduce the
circumstances that originally led to the creation of the groups that are
now the object of demobilization efforts. 99
Programs that benefit the demobilized by giving them access to job
training, income and employment generation, and psychosocial accompaniment are equally divisive and may cause resentment in the poor
communities in which the demobilized reside.' These former "criminals" are perceived as having easy access to privileges that are beyond
the reach of many of the poor, who struggle on a daily basis. Above all
else, the IACHR concludes that "[t]he demobilization mechanisms have
not been accompanied by comprehensive measures to provide relief to
the victims of the violence nor to clarify the many criminal acts that remain unpunished, and therefore the factors generating the conflict in
large measure persist."'0 '
Thus, neither the number of demobilized combatants compiled in the
aggregate statistics nor televised collective demobilization ceremonies
are sufficient to satisfy a need for substantive compliance and justice.
Even if sincere, these events do not reflect careful consideration of the
social processes that must accompany them. The result is collective demobilizations that run the risk of remaining mere rituals of statecraft,
lacking social resonance. They confirm what many of these community
members and former combatants fear: that it is all a faqade-the state in
its theatrical register, orchestrating a transition that does not reach beyond the flat, shiny surface of the television screen.
D. Reintegration: Towards a Concept of Reconciliation?
Frequently, peace processes, democratic transitions, and "national
reconciliation" efforts are little more than the restructuring of elite pacts
of governability and domination. In these superficial forms of reconciliation, the dialogue involves the same interlocutors, the same silences, and
the same exclusionary logics that existed previously. Maximizing the
commitment of demobilized combatants to reintegrating themselves into
IACHR II, supra note 25, 179.
99.
For example, the "Regreso a la Legalidad" [Return to Legality] program provided
100.
social benefits for the 868 who demobilized in Medellfn as a means of promoting their reincorporation into civilian life. Id. 80.
101.
Id. T 60.
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"legal life" requires public rituals that construct a new way of coexisting,
as well as a redistribution of resources and power.
For example, in South Africa, the discourse of national reconciliation was, to a great extent, dominated by political and religious leaders.
Wilson criticizes the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) for having deployed the concept of reconciliation in a topdown manner, leaving little space to express the sentiments of retribution
and revenge that operated in the local sphere. °2 The failure to translate
the grand vision of national reconciliation to the local level was striking,
and religious and political elites appropriated the term "reconciliation"
as a meta-narrative to reconstruct the nation-state and their hegemony,
post-apartheid. Wilson argues that part of the gap between national and
local processes resulted from the lack of "any dispute-resolution mechanisms within the TRC framework to negotiate the return of former
'pariahs' to the community."'' 0 3 His conclusions support the need to reincorporate demobilized combatants into the communities in which they
live, and the need to work with the victims, the victimizers, and the
beneficiaries in reconstructing social life.
This challenge underscores the fact that the least studied and least
successful phase of DDR is reintegration, which should in fact be a central focus in Colombia.'0 4 If ex-combatants are not provided with viable
paths leading to their reincorporation into society, then they may choose
to "return to the hills" and the fighting that has convulsed Colombia for
more than four decades. Moving DDR onto the terrain of transitional
justice may work to the benefit of both former combatants and broader
society. The Colombian experiment may be the first to implement the
recommendations in the newly released Stockholm Initiative on DDR,
which advocates reformulating traditional DDR to include links to transitional justice and reconciliation measures.105
E. The Demobilized as TransitionalSubjects?
The interviews conducted for this study enabled critical insights into
the reintegration process. Of the 112 individuals interviewed, ninety percent were combatientes rasos (foot soldiers) or squadron leaders in
charge of a maximum of ten to fifteen men. These individuals were chosen for interviews because they represent the "castaways" of the warthe cannon fodder that are often expendable and woefully replaceable.
102.
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We emphasize the need to differentiate according to rank and to recognize that while many of these ex-combatants do blur the line between
victim and perpetrator, they are not among those who are the true beneficiaries of the war. Obviously, differences in rank translate into
differences in earnings and responsibilities; they also influence combatants' intellectual authorship, the severity of their crimes, and their sense
of guilt and the guilt others attribute to them.
Our research demonstrates that key factors motivating the combatant's
desire to participate in the DDR program include missing one's hometown, friends, and family, as well as the "war weariness" so many of these
men and women expressed. One factor contributing to this fatigue is the
lack of any meaningful ideology that these combatants might use to justify
their actions. It was common to hear that "this war is just a business," and
that these men were tired of "killing innocent people-people I didn't
even know."'6
Another phrase that echoes throughout our conversations with excombatants is volver al monte (return to the hills), a symbolically rich
idea that invokes far more than a geographical location. The former
combatants described life in "the hills" (the battle front) as marked by
gnawing hunger, days and weeks without sleep, sickness without access
to medical care or medications, lives of fear and clandestinity, and incessant killing or watching others being killed. The harsh reality of life in
the hills has played a key role in motivating demobilization. Moreover,
family proved essential, acting as a bridge between life in the hills and
memories of civilian existence-a tie that enabled many of these former
combatants to remember that they were still human beings, even out in
the hills. Indeed, our findings indicate that the majority of these former
combatants are looking for some way to leave the war behind, and yet
they are living in the midst of an ongoing armed conflict. The irony is
that these demobilized combatants are, in many cases, "transitional subjects." Unfortunately, the social context is not.
Our research also indicates that paramilitary demobilization must extend beyond the former combatants to include their social environment,
requiring that national processes and policies be combined with local and
regional initiatives. While local processes should not be romanticized as
intrinsically harmonious or democratic, neither should they be overlooked.
Reconciliation needs to include certain performative aspects. For instance,
collectives engage in "ritual purification" and the reestablishment of
Research based on 112 in-depth interviews with demobilized combatants, followed
106.
by more focused analysis of three sites: Bogotd, Medellin, and Turbo-Apartado. Sixty-four
interviewees were from the guerrilla (ELN or FARC) and forty-eight were from the AUC. Of
the 112, fourteen were women, all of whom were ex-guerrillas. For a fuller discussion of this
research, see Theidon & Betancourt, supra note 7, at 58.
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group unity via the secular rituals embodied in transitional legal practices. From this perspective, law is not only a set of procedures, but also
a series of secular rituals that break with the past and mark the beginning
of a new moral community. Although the literature on transitional justice
has focused almost exclusively on the international and national spheres,
transitional justice is not the exclusive preserve of either international
tribunals or states: communities also mobilize the ritual and symbolic
elements of these transitional processes to deal with the deep cleavages
left, or accentuated, by civil conflicts.' 7
To assume that a change in legal status-combatant to excombatant-will translate into the social sphere in the absence of any
preliminary process of consultation with the host community is shortsighted. Interviews with people in the surrounding neighborhoods reveal
the deep mutual fear that exists between the ex-combatants and the host
community. The failure to involve this broader community leads to a
vicious cycle of suspicion and fear, both on the part of the "reintegrated" ex-combatants and members of the communities who suddenly find themselves living with former killers. One person assured us
that everyone looks at these demobilized combatants as though they
were "people from a new race." Ex-combatants also worry enormously
about their own security. One of the administrators of the Bogotd DDR
program expressed this mutual fear:
Really, I think it's a fairly complex process. First of all, the
beneficiaries of the program are running a huge risk if they leave
the program early because nobody has any idea what they will
do if they have to manage their own homes. In addition to this,
there's the question of what they will do whenever the state's aid
runs out-how will they make a living when it's over? And then
there's the problem of what might happen if the community does
not know how to receive them. There hasn't been any work with
the community so that they become used to all the demobilized.
There has not been much concern for facing the question
of how
0 8
they could and would ultimately have to live together.
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The question of how to live together resonated among the former
combatants as well as their social circles and the host communities.
DDR must extend beyond the mere collection of weapons to seriously
address the reincorporation of ex-combatants into society, and that reincorporation will involve issues of justice, reparation, and reconciliation.
Author Theidon, in her work with the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation
Commission in Ayacucho, studied how people attempt to reconstruct
social relationships and sociability after years of living as "intimate
enemies."' 9 It is clear that local initiatives and local processes play a key
role in post-conflict reconciliation. " 0 Reconciliation is forged and lived
locally, among families, neighbors, and communities. Without implementing mechanisms for the return and reintegration of former
"pariahs"-mechanisms that would provide security for all concerned as
well as ensure forms of justice and reparation-the DDR process will
continue to be hampered by the high level of impunity that has characterized the program to date.
F. The Transformation of DDR: The Introduction
of TransitionalJustice Concepts
The concerns generated by the reintegration process ultimately give
rise to issues intimately connected to transitional justice and ultimately
international law: the victims and their rights. Colombia provides a salient example of how international pressure affects traditional DDR
processes, in particular through the involvement of international monitoring bodies. In early 2004, the Member States of the Organization of
American States (OAS) unanimously expressed their "unequivocal support for the efforts of the Government of President Uribe to find a firm
and lasting peace," along with their interest in supporting the peace
process."' In what some perceive as a promotional strategy, the Colombian government signed an agreement with the General Secretariat of the
OAS on January 23, 2004, to set up the Misi6n de Apoyo al Proceso de
Paz en Colombia (MAPP/OEA) (Mission to Support the Peace Process
in Colombia)." 2 MAPP/OEA's mandate includes overseeing and verifying initiatives undertaken to secure a ceasefire and an end to hostilities
109.
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(2004).
Id. (providing an illustration of different local mechanisms used by rural communi110.
ties in Peru to reinsert members who had become subversives).
OAS Res. 1397/04, OEA/Ser.G/CP/RES.859 (Feb. 6, 2004) [hereinafter OAS ResoIl1.
lution].
112.
Agreement for Monitoring of the Peace Process in Colombia, Colom.-OAS, Jan.
23, 2004, approved Feb. 6, 2004.
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through DDR strategies." 3 It has assumed the responsibility for oversight
of the demobilization effort, which includes monitoring the concentration zone; keeping an inventory of weapons, war material, and
munitions; and assuring respect for the ceasefire at the national level.
It
4
has also assisted in the reinsertion of paramilitaries into civilian life.'
Despite this front-line role, the mission may not publicly comment
on the demobilization efforts unless requested to do so by the Colombian
government." 5 It also has no power to sanction paramilitaries who fail to
meet the terms of their demobilization agreements." 6 The process has
therefore been criticized as lacking transparency and effective oversight.1 7 These shortcomings have led some countries to demand the
establishment of a legal framework that would ensure respect for international norms of truth, justice, and reparation." 8 Specifically, the OAS
Permanent Council highlighted the need to "ensure that the role of the
OAS is fully consistent with the obligations of its Member States with
respect to the effective exercise of human rights and international humanitarian law," and invited the IACHR to provide advisory services to
the MAPP/OAS Mission. ' 9
In July 2004, the IACHR delegation visited Colombia to evaluate the
demobilization process and the legal regime under which it operated.'2 °
In its concluding report, the IACHR mission observed, "[t]he demobilization mechanisms have not been accompanied by comprehensive
measures to provide relief to the victims of the violence nor to clarify the
many criminal acts that remain unpunished, and therefore the factors
generating the conflict in large measure persist."' 2' As a result, the
IACHR offered "background information in the form of case-law and
doctrinal writings on peace processes and administration of justice to be
taken into account in the demobilization process.' 22 This decisive move
prompted a vigorous political campaign that helped insert transitional
justice guidelines into the DDR process.
Diverse monitoring bodies and human rights organizations began to
demand that Colombia's demobilization process be coupled "with guar113.
114.
115.
(Apr. 17,
116.
117.
118.

IACHR II, supra note 25, T 1.
AI, supra note 8, at 15-16.
Interview with member of the MAPP/OAS Mission, in Barrancabermeja, Colom.
2006).
Al, supra note 8, at 16.
Id. at 48.
Id. at 15.

119.
OAS Resolution, supra note I11.
120.
The delegation was led by the Vice President and Rapporteur for Colombia, Susana
Villarin, and the Executive Secretary of the IACHR, Santiago A. Canton, from July 11 to 17,
2004. IACHR II, supra note 25, exec. summary, 1.
121.
Id. exec. summary, 3.
122.
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antees that the State's international obligations will be respected."'23
Other observers criticized the lack of an adequate legal framework for
setting forth the benefits and conditions of demobilization and the process of dialogue between
the "negotiating high command" of the AUC
24
government.1
and
In particular, concern arose over Decree 128, which excludes benefits for combatants who are "being processed or have been condemned
for crimes which according to the Constitution, the law or international
treaties signed and ratified by Colombia cannot receive such benefits."'25
This decree applies only to ex-combatants who decide to participate in
individual or collective demobilization but who are being investigated or
serving sentences for "lesser" crimes, such as illegal possession of arms,
membership in illegal armed groups, and petty crimes. But Law 782 defines the crimes referenced in Decree 128 as "atrocious acts of ferocity or
barbarism, terrorism, kidnapping, genocide, and murder committed outside combat," among others.'2 6 The gap created by Law 782 attracted
international scrutiny and required the government to create an alternative
framework for the DDR process to deal with members alleged to have
committed human rights abuses.
The international community took advantage of the opportunity to
modify the DDR process by drawing attention to the missing link in the
standard DDR process-concern for the victims and the host communities. Thus, the IACHR endorsed "genuine mechanisms of participation
...in secure conditions, for the victims of the conflict, so as to ensure
access to truth, justice, and reparation.' 27 It found the negotiations and
ceasefire to be at a crucial stage that "should be guided by the principles
and standards set forth in international law for resolving armed conflicts" while also respecting the "state's obligation to ensure justice,
truth, and reparations for all persons under their [sic] jurisdiction.' 28 Accordingly, the IACHR included a section in its 2004 report on Colombia,
Principles and Standards for Overcoming Armed Conflicts and their
Consequences for the Civilian Population, noting that:
The successful development of a process of demobilization ...
calls for the clarification of the violence and reparation of its
consequences. Realistic expectations of peaceful coexistence
under the rule of law should be based on measures that address
123.
RIGHTS

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

IACHR, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN
2005, 12, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. 124, Doc. 5 (Feb. 27, 2006).
IACHR II, supra note 25, exec. summary, 8.
Decree No. 128 of Jan. 22, 2003, art. 21, O.G. No. 45.073, Jan. 24, 2003 (Colom.).
Law No. 782 of Dec. 23, 2002, art. 19, O.G. No. 45.043, Dec. 23, 2002 (Colom.).
IACHR I, supra note 25, exec. summary, 14.
Id. [94.
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the challenges posed by the construction of a culture of tolerance
and the rejection of impunity. The international community has
identified a series of guidelines with respect to truth, justice, and
reparations that draw on the experiences of different societies
and the principles of law reflected in the obligation of states to
administer justice in keeping with international law.'29
Similarly, Amnesty International noted the need to balance individual rights within the demobilization process as a means of combating
impunity:
The right of victims to truth, justice and reparation must form
the backbone of efforts to resolve the conflict. Truth, justice and
reparation play a key role in ensuring against repetition of human rights abuses. They are essential components of a just and
lasting peace and of a future in which human rights are respected and protected. 30
International critics thus invoked what have become classic debates
in the transitional justice literature regarding impunity through amnesty,
the difficulty of balancing the desire for peace with the demands for justice, and the need for domestic legal principles to respect changes in
international jurisprudence.
G. Legislating Peace and Justice
International pressure greatly shaped the legislative history of the legal framework eventually adopted to deal with the "gap" created by Law
782. The resulting Justice and Peace Law helped merge DDR and transitional justice into one legal framework. The merger signifies a
momentous break from all previous conventional demobilization frameworks applied in Colombia.' Above all else, it also creates a novel legal
model that mirrors the growing consensus that DDR can no longer operate independently of those considerations normally associated with
transitional justice-the rights of victim-survivors to truth, justice, and
reparations.
Yet, as will be discussed in this next section, the resulting law did
not emerge without substantial debate. For those accustomed to an unbridled freedom to broker peace through the most expedient means
available, this new direction presented formidable alterations in thinking
and practice. Resistance to this new model slowly subsided in the face of
consistent lobbying by national and international intermediaries commit129.
130.
131.

Id. T 10.
Al, supra note 8, at 16.
See supra Part III.A.
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ted to the task of establishing new limits to acceptable peacemaking
practices.
Indeed, the "give and take" between these two positions was apparent from the very start of Colombia's most recent attempt to create a
legal framework for demobilization. To encourage demobilization and
reincorporation into civilian life, the government's first proposed initiative in 2003 contemplated the elimination of criminal sentences
altogether for persons who had committed serious violations of human
rights or international humanitarian law.'32 In defense of the initiative,
President Uribe commented that he understood "the concern raised by
offering alternative sentences for grave crimes, . . . [b]ut in a context of
30,000 terrorists, it must be understood that a definitive peace is the best
have never lived a single
justice for a nation in which several generations
33
day without the occurrence of a terrorist act."'1
After a considerable national and international outcry ensuedmagnified by a heated debate in the Colombian Congress-the bill was
withdrawn for modification. 34 The IACHR referred to its court's "clear
and firm jurisprudence" denouncing "enactment of laws that limit the
scope of judicial proceedings intended to clarify and redress basic human rights violations committed during a domestic armed conflict
....
Yet, the lack of balance between the demands of peacemaking
and the rights of victim-survivors reflected a tension that would come to
color the state's position not only for the remainder of negotiations over
the law but also in the aftermath of its eventual promulgation.
In the wake of President Uribe's failed initiative, a series of new
proposals appeared, each attempting to respond to the new internationally imposed limits yet representing the range of possibilities along the
DDR and transitional justice spectrum. Indeed, the legislative agenda of
the Colombian House of Representatives indicates that nine such bills
were presented between July 2004 and June 2005, and significantly, all

IACHR II, supra note 25, T 63.
Peter Slevin, Colombian President Defends Amnesty for Paramilitary Troops,
WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 2003, at A17.
UNHCR-Colom., Observaciones sobre el Proyecto de Ley por la cual se dictan
134.
disposiciones en procura de la reincorporaci6nde miembros de grupos armados que contribuyan de manera efectiva a la paz nacional (Sept. 23, 2003), available at
http://www.hchr.org.co/publico/pronunciamientos/ponencias/po0329.pdf. See also Letter from
U.N. High Comm'r for Human Rights Office-Colom. to Legislators of the First Comm'n of
the Senate and House of Representatives, Observacionessobre el Pliego de Modificaciones al
Proyecto de Ley "por la cual se dictan disposiciones para la reincorporacidnde miembros de
grupos armadas organizados al margen de la ley que contribuyan de manera efectiva a la
consecucion de la paz," DRP/1 75/05 (Mar. 30, 2005) [hereinafter Letter to Legislators].
IACHR, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE IACHR 2003, ch. IV, 19, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. 118,
135.
Doc. 5 rev. 2 (Dec. 29, 2003).
132.
133.
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were categorized as relating
to the "[r]einsertion of armed groups operat36
ing outside of the law."'
The proposed legislation coincided with the Coordination and International Cooperation Roundtable for Colombia, held in London in July
2003 and Cartagena in February 2005 and involving the Colombian government and potential donors, such as the G24 countries, the InterAmerican Development Bank, and the United Nations. 37 While the purpose of the international meetings was to discuss recommendations
issued by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Office in Colombia, they inevitably involved discussion of the DDR process.' 38 These
meetings may have been a turning point in the negotiations in that they
communicated clearly to the Colombian government that it would have
to bring DDR into compliance with international standards on truth, justice, and reparation. Moreover, they ignited the lobbying efforts of local
and international human rights groups.
Transitional justice principles and rules, grounded in international
law, became the "parameters to be taken into account at the moment of
judging whether the demobilization process of armed illegal groups satisfies the requirements of truth, justice and reparation for the victims of
the armed conflict in Colombia.' 3 9 Yet, at the same time, the challenges
of integrating transitional justice principles into a pre-post-conflict situation were not overlooked, as evidenced by a letter issued by the UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights stating that "mechanisms of transitional justice should only be applied within processes of negotiation,
dialogue and agreements with illegal armed groups that have previously
agreed with the government to demobilize and dismantle.' ' 41° These pronouncements, combined with the stream of legislation being presented,
pressured the Minister of the Interior to present the international community with a revised bill during the Cartagena meeting. The revisions
incorporated provisions on truth, justice, and reparations, 4 ' but when the
136.
HRW, supra note 67, n.28 (citing Listo Nuevo Proyecto Que Busca Marco Juridico
Para Grupos Armados Irregulares, EL ESPECTADOR, Dec. 17, 2004). For a specific list of
proposals, see Secretary-General of Legislation, Camara de Representantes de Colombia,
Agenda Legislativa:Julio 20 de 2004 a Junio 20 de 2005.
137.
Cartagena Declaration, Cartagena de Indias, Feb. 3-4, 2005, availableat http://epped.europarl.eu.int/Press/peve05/docs/050922cartagenadeclarationen.doc; Al, supra note 8, at
21 n.32. The Cartagena meeting was attended by high-level representatives of the governments of Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Japan, Mexico, Norway, Switzerland, the United
States, the EU and its Member States, the European Commission, the UN system, the CAF,
the IDB, the IMF, the World Bank, and the Colombian government. Id. at 22 n.33.
138.
Al, supra note 8, at 16, 21 n.32.
139.
IACHR II, supra note 25, exec. summary, 7.
140.
Letter to Legislators, supra note 134, at 5.
141.
HRW, supra note 67, n.30 (citing Gobierno PresentardMarco Legal Para Desmovilizaci6n de Paramilitaresel Pr6ximo Mes de Febrero,EL TIEMPO, Dec. 14, 2004).
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bill was presented to the Colombian Congress the next day, these provisions had already been weakened. 4 2 The Minister's comments reflected
the continued resistance to altering traditional DDR approaches that
were predicated upon leniency for armed actors. Indeed, a series of further modifications weakened the proposal that eventually
constituted the
43
final bill approved by the Colombian Congress.
IV. TENSIONS

IN BALANCING THE POLITICAL WITH THE LEGAL:

DDR

AND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE

The debate surrounding the creation of a legal framework for Colombia's peace process has revealed the tension between the state's
political need to promote DDR and its legal obligations under human
rights and international humanitarian law. Law 975/05, signed by President Uribe July 22, 2005, embodies the strain between these two
competing principles and the difficulties inherent in balancing the need
to broker peace between warring factions with the obligation to respect
the rights of those who suffered harm during the armed conflict.'" Attempting to integrate principles of international law into a DDR process
can seem futile if done only superficially or for political expediencyvictim-survivors may reject these cosmetic alterations and at times the
entire transitional justice package.
As discussed above, the Justice and Peace Law was originally designed to fill the gap left by Law 782/02 and Decree 128/03, which
pertain to Colombia's "foot soldiers" who elected to participate in the
demobilization, benefiting from a process that de facto amounts to a pardon or amnesty. Left over are those who do not qualify for this amnesty
because they are under investigation for grave human rights violations.
In this way, the Justice and Peace Law does not supersede, but rather
complements, the demobilization law. The UN Permanent Mission to
Colombia clearly explains that the Justice and Peace Law "is exceptional
in nature, inasmuch as it is not a law intended for normal times but rather
' 45
to encourage an end to violence by organized groups outside the law."'
142.
Al, supra note 8, at 22.
143.
Colombian High Commissioner for Peace Luis Carlos Restrepo and Vice President
Francisco Santos had lent their support to an even weaker bill that had been presented by
Senator Armando Benedetti. The final bill was presented to Congress on March 3, 2005.
144.
Law No. 975 of July 22, 2005, O.G.No. 45.980, July 25, 2005 (Colom.), available
at http://www.coljuristas.org/justicia/LEY%20975%20DE%202005.pdf#search=%22Ley%20
975%20%22diario%20oficial%22%20colombia%22.
145.
OAS, Observations and Recommendations of the Permanent Council on the Annual
Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, at 20, OEA/Ser.G, CP/CAJP2399/06 (May 16, 2006) [hereinafter OAS Observations and Recommendations].

Michigan Journal of InternationalLaw

[Vol. 28:49

Interestingly, the title of the law reads "for the... reincorporation of
members of armed groups operating outside the law who contribute in an
effective manner to the achievement of national peace."'' 46 While the law
thus places emphasis on the "R" of DDR, it also integrates transitional
justice concepts in its "Definition and Principles," which includes as the
law's primary objective "to facilitate the peace process and the individual and collective reincorporation of members of extra-legal armed
groups into civil life,
guaranteeing the rights to truth, justice and repa47
ration of victims.'

In fact, the Justice and Peace Law emphasizes criminal proceedings
to accomplish this goal, with Article 2 clarifying that the law "regulates
the judicial investigation, procedures, sanction and benefits of people
linked to armed groups operating outside the law, as authors or participants in criminal acts committed during and as part of their membership
to these groups, who have decided to demobilize and contribute decisively to national reconciliation. 4 8 In particular, it regulates the
conditions for providing an "alternative sentence," instead of a standard
punishment in exchange for "contributions to the achievement of national peace, collaboration with justice, reparation to the victims and an
adequate re-socialization."'' 49 The law contemplates both collective and
individual demobilization, but first requires that individuals who choose
to participate in the process must appear on the Attorney General's list
provided by the national government as part of its peace talks, while also
adhering to the requirement that illegal activity cease. 50
While the thrust of the law and the mechanisms it puts in place emphasize the DDR process, the influence of international actors can be seen
through the explicit protection of victims' rights. Specifically, Article 4
establishes that the process of national reconciliation "should always promote the right of victims to truth, justice and reparation" as well as
"respect the right to due process and judicial guarantees of the prosecuted."'' The law also explicitly protects the right to effective
investigations and sanctions, the right to truth, and the right to reparation. 52 Finally, the law creates the Comisirn Nacional de Reparacionesy
Reconciliaci6n (CNRR) (National Reparations and Reconciliation Com146.
Law No. 975 of July 22, 2005, O.G. No. 45.980. Article I defines "grupo armado
organizado al margen de la ley" as pertaining to both guerrilla and paramilitary groups, or a
significant and integral section of either in blocks, fronts, or other modalities that come under
Law 782 of 2002. Id. art. 1.
147.
Id. art. 1 (author's translation) (emphasis added).
148.
Id. art. 2 (author's translation).
149.
Id. art. 3 (author's translation).
150.
Id. arts. 10-11 (author's translation).
151.
Id. art. 4 (author's translation).
152.
Id. arts. 6-8.
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mission) to assist in guaranteeing these rights.'53 Despite these textual pro-

visions, internal contradictions in the law were quickly criticized for
undermining the goals of victim protection.
A. Challenges to the Law

Contradictions in Law 975/05 prompted vociferous national and international criticism, including general objections and pronouncements
from the United Nations, the IACHR, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty
International, and the Colombian Commission of Jurists, among others. 1 4 Sectors of Colombia's civil society also organized to protest the
law. For instance, the Movimiento de Victimas de Crimenes de Estado

(Movement of Victims of State Crimes, or Victims' Movement) was
formed on June 25, 2005.1 5 The movement, composed of numerous
grassroots organizations and growing rapidly from 300 to approximately
800 delegates from around the country, protested the approval of Law
975/05. 56 It also brought one of the ten national lawsuits presented be57
fore the Colombia Constitutional Court.'
Another lawsuit, brought by a consortium of 105 human rights and
victim-survivors' organizations, challenged the form or content of thirtythree of the seventy-two articles in Law 975/05." 8 On May 18, 2006, the
Constitutional Court ruled on the merits of this challenge, issuing its
opinion in Gustavo Gall6n Giraldo v. Colombia. 59 The consortium's
claims were supported by amicus curiae from national and international6
actors such as the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ).'
The decision prompted significant controversy in Colombia, especially
from paramilitary leaders, but it set important parameters for the balance
between peace and justice. 6' Although the Colombian Constitutional
153.
Id. arts. 50-51 (author's translation).
154.
Interview with a lawyer at Instituto Latinoamericano de Servicios Alternativos
(ILSA), in Colom. (July 31, 2006).
155.
Victims' Movement website, http://www.movimientodevictimas.org/?q=/taxonomy/

term/67.
156.
See id.
157.
El Movimiento Nacional de Vfctimas de Crfmenes de Estado y otros, Contra la
Totalidad de la Ley 975 de 2005, (Sept. 9, 2005) (challenging the constitutionality of Law
975).
158.
Gustavo Gall6n Giraldo y otros v. Colom., Const'l Ct. Jgmt. No. C-370/2006, Expediente D-6032 (May 18, 2006).
159.
Id.
160.
Brief for ICTJ as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants, Gustavo Gall6n Giraldo y
otros v. Colom., availableat http://www.ictj.net/downloads/colombia.amicus.spa.pdf.
161.
Paramilitary leaders asserted the ruling was "a fatal blow to the peace process,"
thereby provoking the Interior and Justice Minister, Sabas Pretelt, to express his "concern." La
Corte ConstitucionalTuvo Que Emitir Un Comunicado Aclarando La Decisidn, EL TIEMPO,
May 20, 2006, availableat http://www.icpcolombia.org/documentos/15a121 demayo.doc.
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Court upheld the law in general terms, it declared other articles partially
or wholly 62 unconstitutional, tilting the balance in favor of victimsurvivors.
In the following sections, we offer an overview of the various criticisms of Law 975/05, including arguments made in Gustavo Gall6n
Giraldo,couched within an overview of the transitional justice paradigm
presented in the academic literature. The amalgam of civil society responses to the law reflects current national and international expectations
of transitional justice that limit the scope of the state's prerogatives in
peace negotiations and political transitions. Indeed, the legal challenges
center around the absence of perfect protection of the three central components of transitional justice: truth, justice, and reparations. 63 We
examine how the Constitutional Court sought to resolve these tensions,
in particular by elevating peace to a right in an effort to legitimize a proportionality test that often provokes disagreement among international
law purists.'6 While it is beyond the scope of this Article to present a
comprehensive analysis of the law and the Constitutional Court ruling,
we offer this preliminary examination in anticipation of further analysis
once implementation of Colombia's Law 975/05 begins.
1. The Right to Justice
In the course of its development, the field of transitional justice has
helped establish justice as a key principle of international law. 65Historically, absolute amnesties have been used as bargaining tools to end
repressive regimes or war, preserve peace, prevent further hostilities, or
promote transitions to civilian governments.' 66 Yet, in many transitional
justice settings, amnesties are not intended to facilitate the surrender of
weapons or an end to hostilities, but rather, later in the peace process, to
facilitate investigation of human rights. 167 For instance, in South Africa,
162.
Gall6n Giraldo, Const'l Ct. Jgmt. No. C-370/2006, Expediente D-6032.
See HAYNER, supra note 2 (providing an overview of the features of truth commis163.
sions within a transitional justice context).
Mark J. Osiel, Why Prosecute? Criticsof Punishmentfor Mass Atrocity, 22 HUM.
164.
RTS. Q. 118 (2000) (critiquing absolute legal demands for prosecutions).
165.
Miriam J. Aukerman, Extraordinary Evil, Ordinary Crime: A Framework for Understanding TransitionalJustice, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 39, 40 (2002) (explaining that despite
debates on prosecutions in transitional justice, there is a basic assumption that criminal trials
are the optimal approach).
166.
Naomi Roht-Arriaza & Lauren Gibson, The Developing Jurisprudenceon Amnesty,
20 HUM. RTS. Q. 843 (1998) (providing a historical examination of the development of amnesties).
167.
See Gwen K. Young, All the Truth and as Much Justice as Possible, 9 U.C. DAvis J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 209 (2003); Diane E Orentlicher, Swapping Amnesty for Peace and The
Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Crimes, 3 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 713 (1997) (concluding
that amnesties have implications for peace in countries emerging from conflict).
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amnesties were a tool for gathering a "fuller truth" about the past to satisfy a national need for reconciliation. 68 Even then, amnesties met with
great opposition.' 69 Advocates of justice--defined to include investigation, prosecution, and sanction of wrongdoers---challenge the use of
amnesties17 and the claim that the right to an effective remedy before a
competent national court "is one of the fundamental pillars" of the rule
of law and the state's duty to guarantee human rights protection. 7' Conpropelled the rights of victim-survivors into the peace
sensus has
72
formula.

a. Reduced Sentence as Veiled Amnesty
Issues related to the appropriate dose of criminal justice cut to the
heart of the debates regarding Law 975/05. As Kerr observes,
"[p]unishment has been the sticking point in the 'peace talks' between
the Government of Colombia (GOC) and the paramilitaries.'17 The ability to determine "optimal levels" of punishment constitutes the
bargaining chip in Colombia's transitional justice process, with Law
975/05 embracing a middle path: the law does not offer a South Africastyle amnesty, but it also does not promise full criminal trials as in Peru.
168.
See Ronald C. Slye, Amnesty, Truth and Reconciliation: Reflections on the South
African Amnesty Process, in TRUTH V. JUSTICE 171 (Robert I. Rotberg & Dennis Thompson
eds., 2000) (concluding that South African amnesty was sophisticated, providing truth, reconciliation, and accountability); Stephen Landsman, Alternative Responses to Serious Human
Rights Abuses: Of Prosecution and Truth Commissions, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn
1996, at 81 (providing a comparison of the advantages and disadvantages of both prosecutions
and truth commissions).
See Paul Lansing & Julie C. King, South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Com169.
mission: The Conflict Between IndividualJustice and National Healing in the Post-Apartheid
Age, 15 ARIZONA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 753 (1998).
170.
Review of the academic literature shows a growing coalition of academics and
practitioners offering legal arguments against the legitimacy of amnesties. In fact, Jo M.
Pasqualucci called upon the Inter-American Court to rule on the issue. See generally Jo M.
Pasqualucci, The Whole Truth and Nothing But the Truth: Truth Commissions, Impunity and
the Inter-American Human Rights System, 12 BOSTON UNIV. INT'L L.J. 321 (1994); see also
Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Combating Impunity: Some Thoughts on the Way Forward, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1996, at 93; Juan E. M~ndez, Accountability for Past Abuses, 19
HUM. RTS. Q. 255 (1997).
171.
This standard comes from the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. See Castillo
Pdez Case, 1997 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 34, 82 (Nov. 3, 1997); see also Mayagna
(Sumo) Cmty. of Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, 112
(Aug. 31, 2001); Veldsquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, 1987 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 1,
91 (June 26, 1987).
172.
See Raquel Aldana-Pindell, An Emerging Universalityof Justiciable Victims'Rights
in the Criminal Process to CurtailImpunityfor State-Sponsored Crimes, 26 HUM. RTS. Q. 605
(2004).
173.
Katie Kerr, Making Peace with Criminals: An Economic Approach to Assessing
Punishment Options in the Colombian Peace Process, 37 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV.53, 54
(2005).
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The law offers a reduced and qualified punishment via an "alternative"
sentence-suspension of existing sentences and proceedings, to be replaced with imprisonment of no less than five years and no more than
eight years for beneficiaries who comply with the basic demobilizing
requirements. 74 The Colombian Superior Court determines punishment
depending on the gravity of the crime and the defendant's level of collaboration, while aggregating all other proceedings and punishments.'
Time spent in "concentration zones" counts towards reducing the alternative sentence by up to eighteen months.' 76 The government then
decides where the prisoners will serve their sentences, potentially obviating incarceration in regular prisons.' 77 A probationary period equal to half
of the sentence begins upon completing the alternative sentence, and if
all illegal activities cease, the original sentence will extinguish 78 Failure
to refrain from all illegal activity, however, results in reversion back to
the original suspended sentence. Revelation of new crimes not previously included in the defendant's confession will result in a twenty
percent increase of the alternative sentence if omission is found to be
intentional. 179
In the Gall6n Giraldo case, the claimants argued that these provisions disproportionately favor the perpetrators, and that the alternative
sentence and absence of direct investigation and prosecution act as an
indulto velado (veiled pardon). 80 The perpetrator gains leniency without
absolute guarantees to the truth, reparations, or the cessation of hostilities.'8 ' The claimants portrayed Law 975/05 as part of a larger scheme
that creates both "an instrument and system" of impunity."' 8 2 The claimants also asserted that Law 975/05 is "a very sophisticated mechanism
for impunity since it presents definitions and announcements apparently
very generous with regard to the rights of victims, but designs a system
that in an undercover way permits impunity."'8 3 Commenting on the effect of the law, the Victims' Movement claimed the law was "wrongly
called Justice and Peace," and instead asserted that it completes the cir-

174.
Law No. 975 of July 22, 2005, arts. 3, 29, O.G.No. 45.980, July 25, 2005 (author's
translation). Resocialization entails work and study during detention, as well as assisting in
the demobilization of the illegally armed group to which the beneficiary belonged.
175.
Id. arts. 20, 29.
176.
Id. art. 31.
177.
Id.
178.
Id. art. 29.
179.
Id. art. 25.
180.
Gustavo Gall6n Giraldo y otros v. Colom., Const'l Ct. Jgmt. No. C-370/2006,
Expediente D-6032, 23 (May 18, 2006).
181.
Id. at 75. See text accompanying footnotes for lack of absolute guarantees.
182.
Id. at 21,257.
183.
Id. at74.
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cle of impunity initiated by Law 782/02 and Decree 128/03,84 which do
not require criminal investigations. Thus, the Justice and Peace Law only
applies to demobilized persons already under investigation, meaning many
perpetrators may go free. The plaintiffs in Gall6n Giraldoclaimed that the
failure to investigate and sanction crimes promotes repetition and thus undermines prevention.'85 The amicus brief presented by the International
Commission of Jurists argued that the alternative sentence clause contradicts the principle of proportionality, since existing criminal penalties in
Colombia range from ten to forty years for human rights crimes, and if
combined, could result in a life sentence. '1 6 Alternatively, the UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights noted that the reduced sentence would
be fair only if the law guaranteed effective collaboration that revealed
victims. 87
identities, circumstances, motivations, and harms caused to
b. Constraints on an Effective Investigation
The claimants in Gall6n Giraldo argued that Law 975/05 lacks an
effective promise of criminal investigation, and thus punishment, despite
creating special prosecutors, judges, judiciary police, and support staff
for each of these actors.' 88 Claimants also questioned the drastic time
constraints in the law, as charges must be brought thirty-six hours after a
prosecutor presents the "spontaneous confession" to the sitting magistrate. 89 The special prosecutor then has sixty days to investigate and
verify the confession, after which a criminal trial must be initiated within
ten days.' 9 The Gall6n Giraldo claimants contended that these limits do
not guarantee full, effective, and impartial investigation and prosecution
of the individuals responsible for the thousands of serious human rights
violations that occurred during the conflict.' 9' The IACHR pointed out
that "the seriousness and complexity of the crimes perpetrated," along
Declaraci6n Final-IllI Encuentro Nacional de Vfctimas de Crfmenes de Estado,
184.
Ocho propuestas para la verdad, la justicia, la reparaci6n integral, ]a memoria y la no repetici6n de los crfmenes contra la humanidad (July 11, 2006) (on file with authors) [hereinafter
Victims' Final Declaration].
Id. at 28.
185.
Gustavo Gall6n Giraldo y otros v. Colom., Const'l Ct. Jgmt. No. C-370/2006,
186.
Expediente D-6032, 132, 141 (May 18, 2006).
Dir. of the Office in Colom. of the U.N. High Comm'r for Human Rights, Patrones
187.
internacionales en materia de verdad, justicia y reparaci6npara lograr la superacirn del
conflicto armada interno, Remarks to First Committee of the Senate, (Apr. 2, 2004), available
at http://www.hchr.org.co/publico/pronunciamientos/ponencias/po0437.txt.
Law No. 975 of July 22, 2005, arts. 33, 16, O.G. No. 45.980, July 25, 2005 (Co188.
lom.). For discussion, see OAS Observations and Recommendations, supra note 145, at 26-27.
Law No. 975 of July 22, 2005, arts. 17, 18, O.G. No. 45.980.
189.
Id. art. 18. If the subject accepts the charges, then the court verifies that it was free,
190.
voluntary, and spontaneous. Id. art. 19.
Gall6n Giraldo, Const'l Ct. Jgmt. No. C-370/2006, Expediente D-6032, at 46; Al,
191.
supra note 8, at 23.
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with institutional limits to investigation and prosecution, will make it
difficult to offer "a realistic
alternative to establish individual responsi' 92
bility in full measure."'

c. Involvement of Victim-Survivors
The apparent exclusion of victim-survivors from the criminal process also raised concern. The Gall6n Giraldo claimants criticized the lack
of adequate and explicit guarantees to protect their participation, particularly in terms of access to evidence and participation in all stages of the
process.'93 They argued that Law 975/05 prevents them from contributing
to the litigation strategy and limits their ability to protect their interests
and rights.' 94 The IACHR affirmed that victims' involvement in the legal
process helps "re-establish the conditions of equality that make it possible for the victims of the conflict to recognize their status as citizens and
regain trust in the institutions," making such involvement of "fundamental importance for attaining peace."' 95
Colombia's current "pre-post-conflict" context poses challenges to
the participation of victim-survivors, who still live in great fear and are
reluctant to divulge information or come forward on an individual basis.
The criminal proceedings and largely adversarial posture of Law 975/05
do not necessarily provide the "victim-friendly" forum usually associated with transitional justice measures such as truth commissions. '96
Indeed, Colombia's transitional justice project does not include a truth
commission per se, although the CNRR will assume many tasks associated with such a body, without a truth-seeking component that includes
victims' testimonies.

192.
Press Release, OAS, IACHR, Issues Statement Regarding the Adoption of the "Law
Of Justice And Peace" in Colombia, para. 6 (July 15, 2005), availableat http://www.cidh.org/
Comunicados/English/2005/26.05eng.htm [hereinafter OAS Press Release].
193.
Gall6n Giraldo,Const'l Ct. Jgmt. No. C-370/2006, Expediente D-6032, at 22.
194.
195.

ld. at 21.
IACHR II, supra note 25,

29. The Colombian government amended these limits,

making corrections through Decree 4760, promulgated in 2005, which allows victims to furnish evidence, request information, cooperate with court officials, and be notified of and able
to challenge decisions at each stage of the proceedings. Decree 4760 regulates Law 975/05 in
an effort to assure victim participation, with Article 11(5) clarifying that victims participating
in all stages of the proceedings will receive private legal assistance, or be provided with legal
representation by the Public Ministry. Decree No. 4760 of Dec. 30, 2005, art. 11(5) (Colom.).
For discussion, see OAS Observationsand Recommendations, supra note 145, at 28.
196.
See generally MINOW, supra note 107 (discussing the advantages of a truth com-

mission for providing a forum for victims to tell their stories).
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2. The Right to Truth
The "truth v. justice" debate is central to the field of transitional justice and has helped raise the profile of the right to truth. 197 South Africa's
experience raised questions about whether compromising justice results
in fuller truth, as protected by international law. 98 In addition, the Joinet
Principles establish that "[s]tates must take appropriate action to give
effect to the right to know." '99 The Inter-American Court of Human
Rights has held that victim-survivors or their next-of-kin have the right
to have human rights violations identified and enumerated by competent
organs of the state.0 ° Similarly, the United Nations Human Rights Committee has established a right to judicial determination of the
circumstances of a human rights violation and those responsible for it.2°'
In its discussion of Colombia's DDR process, the IACHR explains that
individuals and societies have the right "to know the truth of what happened as well as the reasons why and circumstances in which the
aberrant crimes were committed, so as to prevent such acts from recurring."20 2 Here, truth relates to more than just knowing about the conduct
of perpetrators; it also means understanding "the objective and subjective
elements that helped create the conditions and circumstances in which
atrocious conduct was perpetrated, and to identify the legal and factual
factors that gave rise to the appearance and persistence of impunity."2 3
In this way, by understanding the full context, causes, and responsibilities of human rights violations, truth and historical memory form part
of reparations."l Substantive and procedural protections ensure this
process: the former relates to revealing what happened, why the crime
occurred, and who committed it; the latter relates to the mechanism most
197.

See generally ROBERT I.

ROTBERG & DENNIS THOMPSON, TRUTH V. JUSTICE

(2000)

(presenting chapters by different authoritative authors to analyze this debate); Thomas M.
Antkowiak, Note, Truth as Right and Remedy in InternationalHuman Rights Experience, 23

J. INT'L L. 977 (2002) (discussing international jurisprudence on the right to truth); see
also The Barrios Altos Case (Chumbipuma Aguirre et al. v. Peru), 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 75, l 45-46 (Mar. 14, 2001).
198.
See generally WILSON, supra note 102 (providing an in-depth analysis and criticisms of this process).
199.
Joinet Principles,supra note 43, princ. 4.
200.
Bimaca Veldsquez Case, 2000 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (set. C) No. 70, 201 (Nov. 25,
2000).
201.
U.N. Human Rights Comm., Communication No. 107/1981, 116, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/19/D/107/1981 (July 21, 1983).
202.
IACHR II, supra note 25, 18.
203.
Id.
MICH.

204.
See Raquel Aldana-Pindell, In Vindication of Justiciable Victims' Rights to Truth
and Justicefor State-Sponsored Crimes, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1399, 1439-41 (2002);
Brandon Hamber, Does the Truth Heal?, in BURYING THE PAST: MAKING PEACE AND DOING
JUSTICE AFTER CIVIL CONFLICT

155, 159 (Nigel Biggar ed., 2003).
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suited to answering these questions.20 ' Raquel Aldana-Pindell notes that
truth commissions often are substituted for criminal trials, circumscribing the full truth.2 Yet in Colombia, the absence of a truth commission
and the undue restrictions placed on criminal proceedings account for
limitations on the pursuit of truth.
a. No Incentive to Give a Full Confession
The truth-gathering capacity of Law 975/05 rests on "spontaneous
confessions, 2°7 in which a demobilized individual offers a free and full
version of the facts, which is subsequently verified in the presence of a
defense lawyer, followed by interrogation by a prosecutor. 20 8 The individual is expected to "manifest the circumstances of time, mode and
place" of the crimes he or she committed as a member of an illegally
armed group, as well as indicate all illegally gained property and goods
to be delivered to the Reparation Fund. 20 9 The Gall6n Giraldo claimants
have complained that an individual may receive full benefits of the law
without ever having to give a full confession, thus failing to make "a
genuine contribution to the clarification of the truth."20 Indeed, the Justice and Peace Law lacks compelling and effective incentives for former
combatants not only to come forward to tell the truth but to reveal it in
full. For instance, if it is later discovered that a demobilized combatant
benefited from the law but did not disclose all of the truth, he or she will
21
be penalized only if the state proves this omission was intentional. '
Amnesty International contended that this burden would "prove practically impossible" to overcome.2 2 Moreover, even where proven to be an
intentional omission, the subject's sentence increases by only twenty
percent of the alternative sentence that was imposed.
The weak investigatory apparatus established by the law could help
participants conceal crimes." ' Without full confessions, many facts will
remain obscured, resulting in uninvestigated crimes and unpunished perpetrators,.. and frustrating the reparatory goals of transitional justice

205.
Aldana-Pindell, supra note 204, at 1439-43.
206.
Id. at 1438.
207.
Law No. 975 of July 22, 2005, art. 17, O.G. No. 45.980, July 25, 2005 (Colom.).
208.
Id. art. 19.
209.
Id. art. 17.
210.
Gustavo Gall6n Giraldo y otros v. Colom., Const'l Ct. Jgmt. No. C-370/2006, Expediente D-6032, 23 (May 18, 2006).
211.
Law No. 975 of July 22, 2005, art. 17, O.G. No. 45.980; supra note 170 and accompanying text.
212.
See Al, supra note 8, at23.
213.
See IACHR, supra note 135, ch. IV, 16.
214.
See OAS Press Release, supra note 192.
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processes.215 The UN Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disap-

pearances points out that neither the collective nor individualized
demobilization efforts in Law 975/05 call for disclosure of the location
of disappeared persons, contrary to treaty law. 216 As the Gall6n Giraldo
claimants point out, the law requires only "an infinitesimal minority" of
demobilized individuals to reveal the truth.2 7 Using statistics from the
Attorney General's office, they estimate that only .48% of all paramilitaries will be subject to Law 975/05, while the remaining 99.52% will
benefit from Law 782/02.28 Of this small pool of duty-bound excombatants, only those who admit the full truth will be subject to prosecution." 9
The claimants further question how Law 975/05 can be effective
given that most human rights violations have never come under investi220
gation. Amnesty International observes that the "endemic nature of
impunity in Colombia" means that most paramilitary members and guerrillas have never come under formal judicial investigation for violations
of human rights or international humanitarian law. 22' They "are even less
likely to have been tried or convicted for such offences. '222 Human
Rights Watch posits that
[b]ecause most paramilitary crimes do not yet have a known author, it is very likely that many individuals who have committed
massacres, kidnappings, or other crimes will be able to avoid detection and prosecution. In effect, historically endemic failures
to properly investigate and prosecute 2paramilitary
abuses would
23
today.
impunity
of
guarantees
become
If unaccompanied by rigorous parallel criminal investigations, Law
975/05 does not create an explicit state burden to investigate. Decree
4760, the preliminary regulation for Law 975/05, indicates that the
215.
See IACHR Il,
supra note 25, 132; U.N.C.H.R. Report, supra note 80, 1 73.
216.
ECOSOC, Comm'n on Human Rights, Report of the Working Group on Enforced
or Involuntary Disappearances,9171-72, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/56/Add.I (Jan. 17, 2006).
The Working Group notes that the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons
from Enforced Disappearances requires efforts to locate the disappeared and permits national
legislation to provide for mitigating circumstances only if this provision assists in obtaining
information relevant to locating the disappeared. Id. 1 70.
217.
Gustavo Gall6n Giraldo y otros v. Colom., Const'l Ct. Jgmt. No. C-370/2006,
Expediente D-6032, 217 (May 18, 2006).
218.
Id. at42.
219.
See id.
220.
Id.; see Alan Seagrave, Conflict in Colombia: How Can Rebel Forces, Paramiliatary Groups, Drug Traffickers and Government Forces be Held Liable for Human Rights
Violations in a Country Where Impunity Reigns Supreme? 25 NOVA L. REV. 525 (2001).
221.
Al, supra note 8,at 20.
222.
Id.
223.
HRW, supra note 67, at 8.
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CNRR will request investigations with necessary supporting information.224 Likewise, the regulation calls for the design of "an appropriate,
transparent and swift mechanism to receive the requests, petitions and
complaints of victims." 225 The Inter-American Court clarified that initiating criminal investigations is the state's legal duty and not the
responsibility of victims and their next-of-kin.226 Given the diminished
probability of an investigation, paramilitaries will feel less compulsion to
confess the truth and resort to the alternative presented by Law 975/05.
Moreover, Law 975/05 made paramilitary activity a seditious crime,
eliminating the threat of extradition or transfer to the International
Criminal Court and further decreasing the incentive to participate.227
b. Focus on Individual Culpability
The Justice and Peace law mandates a "duty of memory '' 128 and requires the preservation of archives229 yet constructs this memory by using
judicial proceedings to establish the facts of individual cases and individual criminal responsibility.2 0 Individualizing the process weakens
efforts to dismantle the paramilitary infrastructure and undermines the
overall goal of DDR.2 The larger context of the war and the history of
the various armed actors will remain under-explored and poorly understood. The need for historical truth means determining "the degree of
involvement of different participants in the perpetration of crimes against
the civilian population by action, omission, collaboration or acquies23
cence.""
Amnesty International calls for the exposure of all economic,
political, and institutional links to the paramilitary, including state institutions and security forces,
individuals, companies, politicians, and other
233
sectors of civil society.

The individualized focus of the Justice and Peace Law also undermines any effort to determine state responsibility for acts and omissions
in protecting citizens.3 As the Victims' Movement points out, Law
224.
Decree No. 4760 of Dec. 30, 2005, art. 23 (Colom.).
225.
Id.
226.
Velisquez Rodrfguez Case, 1988 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, 177 (July 29,
1988); Villagrin Morales Case (The "Street Children" Case), 1999 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 63,1 226 (Nov. 19, 1999).
227.
Law No. 975 of July 22, 2005, art. 71., O.G. No. 45.980, July 25, 2005 (Colom.).

228.

Id. art. 56.

229.
Id. arts. 57-58.
230.
Id. art. 56; OAS Press Release, supra note 192.
231.
Al, supra note 8, at 22.
232.
OAS Press Release, supra note 192.
233.
Al, supra note 8, at 15.
234.
See generally Seagrave, supra note 220 (discussing how the Colombian state would
be held responsible under international law not only for the acts of its own agents but also for
failing to control third parties such as the guerrillas and paramilitary); Roman David &
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975/05 does not "recognize the existence of victims of the State, and
seeks to cover up state responsibility in the creation, encouragement,
development, and consolidation of the paramilitary strategy.' '235 The
Gall6n Giraldo claimants likewise argue that it will not be possible to
identify the systematic and generalized nature of the violations.236 The
Inter-American Court has also established that even if the state does not
officially encourage the formation of paramilitary groups, it remains responsible for tolerating a legal framework that permitted such activity by
not taking the measures "necessary to prohibit, prevent, and duly punish
their criminal activities' 2 37
This type of comprehensive investigation usually occurs through
truth commissions.2 " Truth commissions emphasize that exploring the
broader context of a conflict permits better strategies for addressing its
root causes, especially through institutional reform. Truth commissions
also provide a "collective memory" that permits a country to confront
the past, official denials, and imposed silences.239 This process provides
victim-survivors with public validation of their suffering2 ° and advances
an understanding of "state-sponsored terrorism" not just as a reckless or
aberrant undertaking but rather as "a political project. '24' Finally, this
approach makes the state's obligation to provide integral reparations increasingly irrefutable 22
Above all else, truth commissions place emphasis on the voices of
victims, their families, and other social and political actors.243 Confessions, in contrast, focus on perpetrators, omitting the personal

Susanne Choi Yuk-ping, Victims on TransitionalJustice: Lessons from the Reparation of Human Rights Abuses in the Czech Republic, 27 HuM. RTS. Q. 392 (2005) (providing a general
account of the reparation programs in truth commission settings).
235.
Victims' Final Declaration, supra note 184.
236.
Gustavo Gall6n Giraldo y otros v. Colom., Const'l Ct. Jgmt. No. C-370/2006, Expediente D-6032, 172 (May 18, 2006).
237.
IACHR II, supra note 25, 41.
238.
See generally Audrey R. Chapman & Patrick Ball, The Truth of Truth Commissions:
Comparative Lessons from Haiti, South Africa, and Guatemala, 23 HUM. RTS. Q. 1 (2001);
IACHR II, supra note 25, 16.
239.
See Todd Cleveland, "We Still Want the Truth": The ANC's Angolan Detention
Camps and Post-Apartheid Memory 25 COMP. STUD. S. ASIA, AFR. & MIDDLE E. 63, 71
(2005).
240.
See STANLEY COHEN, STATES OF DENIAL: KNOWING ABOUT ATROCITIES AND SUFFERING OF OTHERS (2001) (providing an overview of the impact of official denial and the need
for acknowledgement).
241.
Graciela Fernandez Meijide et al., The Role of Historical Inquiry in Creating Accountabilityfor Human Rights Abuses, 12 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 269, 269, 276 (1992).
242.
See generally DINAH SHELTON, REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
LAW (1999).

243.
Patrick Smith, Memory without History: Who Owns Guatemala's Past?, WASH. Q.,
Spring 2001, at 59, 64.
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victims. 2 " As Borneman explains, "listening, witnessing,
and retribution cannot be delinked in a project of reconciliation over
time; they are conceptually part of the same complex."2 45 Researching
and reconstructing the truth of violent periods is not a private process but
rather one implicating a whole society, a process more closely associated
with truth commissions. In this way, historical memory projects serve as
an opportunity for those who have been
"excluded, persecuted, [and]
246
stigmatized" to participate in public life.
Thus, while transitional justice projects often attract criticism for
trading justice for truth, Colombia's experience may not even include the
truth-or at least not enough of it. In fact, to some extent Colombia
seems to be doing it backwards, beginning with a commission that attempts to repair and seek peace, followed by a somewhat limited chance
at justice.

experiences

of

c. "Sort of a Truth Commission": The National Reparations
and Reconciliation Commission
The state responded to the purported shortcomings of the Justice and
Peace Law in its report to the Committee on Juridical and Political Affairs of the OAS Permanent Council in April 2006,247 wherein Colombia
claimed that the CNRR vindicates the right to truth. 48 Indeed, Article 51
of Law 975/05 assigns the CNRR a wide array of responsibilities, some
pertaining to the clarification of truth. The CNRR must "guarantee that
victims participate in judicial investigation procedures as well as recognition of their rights";249 "present a public report on the reasons for the
emergence and development of illegal armed groups"; 250 and "monitor
and verify the reinsertion process and the work of local officials so as to
insure full demobilization of illegal armed groups' members and the full

244.
See generally Leigh A. Payne, Perpetrators' Confessions: Truth, Reconciliation,
and Justice in Argentina, in WHAT JUSTICE? WHOSE JUSTICE? FIGHTING FOR FAIRNESS IN
LATIN AMERICA (Susan Eva Eckstein & Timothy P. Wickham-Crowley eds., 2003).
245.
John Borneman, Reconciliation after Ethnic Cleansing: Listening, Retribution,
Affiliation, 14 PUB. CULTURE 281, 295 (2002).
246.
Victims' Final Declaration, supra note 184.
247.
OAS Observationsand Recommendations, supra note 145.
248.
OAS Press Release, supra note 192 (responding to the IACHR's July 15, 2005 press
release stating that the law does not permit clarification of the "historical truth"); OAS Observations and Recommendations, supra note 145 (referring to id. para. 15).
249.
Law No. 975 of July 22, 2005, arts. 51, 52.1 [sic], O.G. No. 45.980, July 25, 2005
(Colom.).
250.
Id. art. 52.2 [sic].
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operation of institutions in those territories."25' Given this array of responsibilities, Dr. Eduardo Pizzaro,252 the president of the CNRR, stated:
The CNRR holds the dear conviction that without the truth, neither justice nor reparations nor reconciliation are possible.
Consequently, reconstruction of the truth, both factual and historical, will be one of the main tasks of our Commission. To that
end, and in line with the text of the law, it is essential to distinguish judicial from historical truth. The former is an essential
task of the judiciary, even though the Commission will need to
insure active participation by victims in the judicial investigations. The latter, on the other hand, will be fundamentally the
task of the CNRR. One and the other, however, are not mutually
exclusive and must accordingly nurture each other.253
In this way, the CNRR assumes the function of a truth commission
without technically being one. Dr. Pizzarro clarified the distinction:
"[t]he CNRR is not itself a truth commission even though many of its
functions ... will be those that create conditions that promote the creation of a truth commission in the future. 254 Article 7(3) of Law 975/05
provides that "judicial proceedings advanced after this law enters into
force will not rule out the application
in the future of other nonjudicial
' 255
mechanisms to reconstruct the truth.
Despite this distinction, Dr. Pizzaro recognized that the CNRR was
assigned certain responsibilities normally given to truth commissions.
He explicitly acknowledged that while other truth commissions were
created after the conclusion of a dictatorship, civil war, or apartheid, the
CNRR "was created in a time when conditions are only now ripening to
overcome the country's armed conflict. ' 2 6 He added that "promoting
policies on truth, justice and reparation in the middle of conflict will be
undoubtedly one of the greatest challenges to confront the CNRR. 257
251.
Id. arts. 51, 52.3 [sic].
252.
The CNRR was sworn in by the President of Colombia on October 4, 2005, choosing Dr. Eduardo Pizarro Le6ngomez as its chair. The CNRR is made up of delegates from the
executive, the Ministry of Justice, the Minister of Finance and Public Credit, the National
Prosecutor's Office, the Public Defender, five personalities, including women appointed by the
president, and two representatives of associations of victims of the conflict, including the
director of the Social Solidarity Network, who serves as Technical Secretary. OAS Observations and Recommendations, supra note 145, at 23.
253.
CNRR, ELEMENTOS PARA LA CONSTRuccI6N DE UNA HOJA DE RUTA 5 (Jan. 17,
2006), available at http://www.presidencia.gov.co/sne/2006/enero/17/ruta.pdf [hereinafter
CNRR HOJA DE RUTA] (author's translation).
254.
Id. at I (author's translation).
255.
Law No. 975 of July 22, 2005, art. 7, O.G. No. 45.980, July 25, 2005 (Colom.).
256.
CNRR HOJA DE RUTA, supra note 253, at I (author's translation).
257.
Id.
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Dr. Pizarro's clarification takes on greater significance in light of the
government's consistent rejection of proposals for the creation of a truth
commission, in the apparent belief that to do so would be inappropriate
before the end of the armed conflict. Even then, some still maintain that
it is "not advisable to publicly disclose what has really happened during
decades of violence because it would worsen the wounds." ' Despite this
reluctance to form a national truth commission, the CNRR appears to be
a mutation of such an entity.
Still, a large sector of the Victims' Movement has publicly condemned the CNRR, which they view as sacrificing their rights. In
response, the Victims' Movement has proposed "an authentic Commission of Historical Clarification when in Colombia there exist real
guarantees for such a body., 259 The lack of victim support for the work of
the CNRR is worrisome, given that the success of such bodies hinges
entirely on victims' participation. On this last point, Stover explains that,
based on his studies in Iraq, Rwanda, and the former Yugoslavia, "all
sectors of a war-ravaged society-the individual, community, society,
and state-should become engaged participants in-and not merely
auxiliaries to-the processes of transitional justice and social reconstruction.,, 260 In Colombia, a significant number of victim-survivors
strongly object to the CNRR, making the CNRR's greatest challenge
finding ways to win the support of these dissenting voices. 261
3. The Right to Reparations
The last decade has seen increasing recognition that the violation of
a human right triggers the subsequent duty to repair the damage caused
by the offense.262 Indeed, recent truth commissions have put greater emphasis on reparations. 263 The ascendance of the right to reparation
became clear through the UN General Assembly's approval of the Basic
Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for
Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Se258.
Juanita Le6n, PorFin, se Conoce la Sentencia sobre Ley de Justiciay Paz, SEMANA,
June 13, 2006, 6, available at http://www.semana.com/wfInfoArticulo.aspx?idArt=95848.
259.
Victims' Final Declaration, supra note 184 (author's translation).
260.
Eric Stover et al., Bremer's "Gordian Knot": TransitionalJustice and the US Occupation of Iraq, 27 HUM. RTS. Q. 830, 834 (2005). For accounts on Rwanda and the former

Yugoslavia, see

MY NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY: JUSTICE AND COMMUNITY IN THE AFTERMATH

OF MASS ATROCITY

(Eric Stover & Harvey M. Weinstein eds., 2005).

261.
Victims' Final Declaration, supra note 184.
262.
For a general discussion of the development of human rights law and the victim's
right to a remedy, see SHELTON, supra note 242, AT 1-37 (1999); for a fuller discussion on the
right to reparations, see Laplante, supra note 46, at347, 351-361.
263.
See Lisa J. Laplante & Kimberly Theidon, Truth with Consequences: Justice and
Reparations in Post-Truth Commission Peru, HUM. RTS. Q. (forthcoming 2007).
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rious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, developed by UN
Special Rapporteur Theo Van Boven (the Van Boven Principles).2 6 In
view of the importance of reparations, critics have drawn attention to
further inadequacies in the Justice and Peace Law.
a. Illicit Goods to Fund Individual Reparations
Law 975/05 presents a comprehensive definition of reparations that
includes restitution, indemnification, rehabilitation, satisfaction, and guarantees against repetition. 26' Furthermore, it refers to both individual and
266
collective reparations. Yet it includes conditions that circumscribe guarantees that reparations will be fully implemented for all of the conflict's
victims. For instance, Law 975/05 stipulates that the Victims Reparation
Fund will consist of all illegal goods and properties from the demobilized individuals subjected to the law, augmented by international
and
2 67
public funds "within the limits authorized by the national budget.
The exclusion of some paramilitary property has generated a range
of criticism. Amnesty International points out the risk that perpetrators
will 'launder or otherwise conceal illicit funds, making their
identification more difficult, or that paramilitaries will have no such
assets.2 6' The Van Boven Principles reiterate that when the person
responsible for the illicit conduct cannot pay reparations, the state should
endeavor to do So.269 Claimants in the Gall6n Giraldo case questioned
the validity of the law's limits on the state's financial contribution based
on budget constraints, arguing that "the state cannot excuse itself from
paying compensation" by arguing it has no available funds. 20 The
claimants also complained that those responsible for crimes should be
required to use all of their property, illegally obtained or not, to meet
their obligations to pay reparations to victims of the conflict. 27' In its
amicus brief, the ICTJ labeled the reparations deceitful because of the
significant risk that victims will not be adequately compensated.272
Transfer of all illicitly gained property to the Victims Reparation Fund
264.
The United Nations General Assembly approved of the principles without vote on
December 16, 2005. See Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law, G.A. Res. 60/147, U.N. GAOR, 60th sess., 64th
plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/Res/60/147 (Dec. 16, 2005).
265.
Law No. 975 of July 22, 2005, art. 8, O.G. No. 45.980, July 25, 2005 (Colom.).

266.

Id.

267.
Id. arts. 10, 11,45, 55.1, 56.
268.
AI, supra note 8, at 24.
269.
IACHR II, supra note 25, 31 n.52 (referring to princ. IX(16-19)).
270.
Gustavo Gall6n Giraldo y otros v. Colom., Const'l Ct. Jgmt. No. C-370/2006,
Expediente D-6032, 63 (May 18, 2006).
271.
Id. at 57.
272.
Id. at 127.
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could also undermine restitution to specific victims, since stolen land
would not necessarily be returned to the rightful owner.27 3
b. Judicial Determination at the Request of Victim-Survivors
In contrast to other transitional justice settings that rely on truth
commissions to present reparation plans, Colombia's plan relies on judicial determinations. Specifically, Article 8 of Law 975/05 holds that
"competent judicial authorities will determine individual, collective, or
symbolic reparations, whichever may be the case, in accordance with the
terms of this law.' 274 At this hearing, the victim-survivor or his or her legal advisers must express in a "concrete manner" the reparations they are
soliciting and must present evidence necessary to prove damages. 27' The
court will encourage a friendly settlement or otherwise will make a ruling for inclusion in the final sentencing conviction. 276 Even if the victimsurvivor does not exercise his or her right to reparation, the law can be
read to establish that the demobilized person will still be eligible for the
alternative sentence. 277 Victims who do not invoke their right during the
special criminal proceedings do not enjoy explicit provisions for individual reparations under Law 975/05. Instead, Article 8 states that
"collective reparation should be oriented towards the psychosocial reconstruction of populations affected by the violence. 278 Yet the law
implies that only victims and their parents are eligible, excluding sib279
lings and other related family members.
The right to reparation should not hinge in this way on victimsurvivors' involvement in judicial proceedings. Instead, as the Gall6n
Giraldo claimants contend, "the right to reparation should be guaranteed
in all circumstances ... taking into consideration that his or her participation may be limited by causes outside of his or her control. 280
Amnesty International also questioned placing the burden of seeking
reparations on victims rather than the state, noting that if the "victim
fails to present a claim, for example, because they [sic] are unaware of
the case, then there will be no reparation., 28' Furthermore, if the victimsurvivor is unable to establish the responsibility for and circumstances
273.
Id. at 58-59.
274.
Law No. 975 of July 22, 2005, art. 8, O.G. No. 45.980, July 25, 2005 (Colom.).
Article 23 sets procedures for this determination. Id art. 23.
275.
Id. art. 23.
276.
Id.
277.
Id.
278.
Id. art. 8.
279.
Id. art. 49.3.
280.
Gustavo Gall6n Giraldo y otros v. Colom., Const'l Ct. Jgmt. No. C-370/2006,
Expediente D-6032, 62 (May 18, 2006).
281.
Al, supra note 8, at 24.
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surrounding a human rights abuse, perhaps in the absence of a full confession, he or she will not be able to direct the claim toward a specific
individual .282 Colombia's framework minimizes the state's responsibility,
and thus its obligation to pay reparations. The IACHR notes that, for
collective reparations, the Justice and Peace Law "places greater emphasis on restitution of unlawfully acquired property than on the kind of
mechanisms that will make full reparations for victims possible" and
omits mention of damage to "the social worlds and relationships of indigenous peoples, Afro-descendant communities, or displaced women,
who are frequently heads of household under conditions of poverty and
extreme duress. Each of these groups rank [sic] among those most vulnerable to the violence perpetrated by participants in the armed
'
conflict."283
In theory, the CNRR has responsibility for overseeing the reparation
process, monitoring and periodically evaluating remedies, and making
recommendations regarding their proper implementation.2 " Within two
years following the law's entry into force, the CNRR will present the
government and the Peace Commissions of the Senate and the House of
Representatives with a report on progress made in paying reparations
and guidelines for future reparations.285 Nonetheless, it remains unclear
to what extent the CNRR will be able to fill the gaps in the reparation
scheme.
B. Putting the Law to the Test

A new addendum in the genealogy of transitional justice sees courts
testing the limits and setting stricter parameters for measures permitted
in political peace processes. In the case of Colombia both national and
international courts have set important precedents.
1. Judgment of the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights on Law 975/05
This trend toward judicial review has greater salience in Latin America due to the availability of contentious jurisdiction in the InterAmerican Court, which has helped build a human rights framework with
noticeable influence on transitional justice projects. 28 6 In fact, the first

282.
Gall6n Giraldo, Const'l Ct. Jgmt. No. C-370/2006, Expediente D-6032, at 63.
283.
OAS Observations and Recommendations, supra note 145, at 18.
284.
Law No. 975 of July 22, 2005, art. 52.4, O.G. No. 45.980, July 25, 2005 (Colom.),
translatedin id. at 24.
285.
Id. art. 52.5.
286.
See generally Lisa J. Laplante, Entwined Paths to Justice: The Inter-American Human Rights System and the Peruvian Truth Commission, in PATHS TO INTERNATIONAL
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test of the limits of Law 975/05 arose through an unprecedented decision
by the Inter-American Court. Usually, a challenge to a national law cannot be brought directly to the Inter-American Court, but rather must arise
after testing its application in a domestic case, such as in the challenges
against Peru's anti-terrorist laws.287 But the Inter-American Court granted
a motion of "supervening event" to issue its opinion on Law 975/05 in
Mapiripdn v. Colombia."'
The case, filed with the court in September 2003, involved the kidnap, torture, and murder of at least forty-nine civilians in July 1997 by
state and paramilitary agents who then threw their victims' bodies in the
Guaviare River in Mapirip.n. In August 2005, soon after President Uribe
signed the Justice and Peace Law, victims' representatives in Mapiripdn
v. Colombia asked the Inter-American Court to consider whether Law
975/05 interferes with the victim's right to a remedy. In accordance with
Article 44.3 of the court's procedures, petitioners requested that the court
"examine the normative framework of the internal legislation and the
demobilization program using international standards related to rights of
victims."28 9 The court found that Law 975/05 did not provide sufficient
incentive for exhaustive confessions, and that the multiple perpetrators
who were part of demobilized paramilitary blocks could deny the full
truth.2 ° It declared that the state must remove all actual and juridical obstacles to an exhaustive judicial examination of the violations,
prosecution of those responsible, and reparations for the victims. 9
The state responded by arguing that Law 975/05 had not been applied in this particular case and therefore was not a "supervening event,"
292
making the law immaterial to the court's decision. In an unprecedented
move, the court referred to its own jurisprudence in holding that no internal law or provision-particularly amnesties, statutes of limitations,
and mitigating factors-can impede a state from complying with the obligation to investigate and sanction those responsible for human rights

JUSTICE: SOCIAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES

(Marie Dembour & Tobias Kelly eds., forthcom-

ing 2007).
287.
For discussion of Peru's experience, see generally Lisa J. Laplante, Heeding Peru's
Lesson: Paying Reparationsto Detainees of Anti-Terrorism Laws 2 HUM. RTS. L. COMMENT.
88 (2006) (discussing the various judgments issued by the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights on Peru's anti-terrorism law). For more discussion on the Inter-American Court's pro-

cedures, see generally Jo M.

PASQUALUCCI, THE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE INTER-

AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS

(2003).

Case of the Mapiripin Massacre v. Colombia, 2005 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.
288.
134,1 301 (Sept. 15, 2005) (author's translation).
289.
Id.
290.
Id. 1 279-280.
291.
Id. 303-04.
292.
Id. 1303.
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violations.: 9' The court's decision to make a pronouncement on Law
975/05 demonstrates the Inter-American Court's growing influence over
domestic matters that interfere with the most fundamental human rights
embodied in the Convention, an influence felt by Colombia's highest
court.

2. Challenging the Law: Balance Between Peace
and Justice in Gall6n Giraldo

Notably, the Colombian Constitutional Court acknowledged in
Gall6n Giraldo "the difficult circumstances in which Colombia, its
population and its institutions are struggling to achieve peace," while not
releasing Colombia from its obligations as a party to the American Convention on Human Rights.294 Specifically, the Court noted the tension
between "finding peace by establishing juridical mechanisms to disarticulate armed groups" and "the interests of justice" under human rights
and international humanitarian law. 29 The Court, however, did not view
this as "an insoluble dilemma," but rather framed its analysis in terms of
the "complementarity
between the right to justice and the right to
296
peace.

In adopting a balancing approach, the Constitutional Court chose a
flexible standard in what is fast becoming a seemingly absolute terrain.
While outright amnesties are no longer accepted, some important academic and legal authorities still concede there is merit in balancing these
interests. Diane Orentlicher warns against adopting "stark dichotomies"
such as "punish or pardon" or "amnesty or accountability." 29 Similarly,
Gwen Young confirms that the balancing test requires looking not only at
"international law obligations, but also at political realities, and individual
and societal needs for justice and reconciliation ....

Resolution will re-

quire balancing the legal, political, and social objectives and realities
surrounding the grant of amnesty.' 298 This task, however, requires a careful examination of all relevant factors to be balanced, their relative
importance, and their absoluteness as a right.
a. The Right to Peace
The Colombian Constitutional Court approached the balancing test
by first examining peace, with Law 975/05 serving as "one of the most
293.
294.
pediente
295.
296.
297.
298.

Id. 1304.
Gustavo Gall6n Giraldo y otros v. Colom., Const'l Ct. Jgmt. No. C-370/2006, ExD-6032, 215 (May 18, 2006) (author's translation).
Id. at 26.
Id.
Orentlicher, supra note 167, at 714.
Young, supra note 167, at 209.
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important pieces in the juridical framework in Colombia's peace proc' Significantly, in Gallan Giraldo, the Court adopted the position
ess."299
that "peace" is not just a political aspiration but also a right, taking the
discussion far beyond the arguments presented by the claimants.3" The
Court recognized that the definition of peace may range from the absence of conflict and confrontation ("basic nucleus") to full compliance
with human rights ("maximum development").'O Furthermore, it discussed the "multifaceted character" of peace as a "collective right within
the third generation of rights ' 302 and viewed the right as a "juridical
duty" of all individuals. 3 3 This perspective reflects what Carl Wellman
describes as the "notion of solidarity" inherent to collective rights, as
they are realized only with the "concerted efforts of all the actors on the
social scene: the individual, the State, the public and private groups, and
the entire international community."34 With this broadly shared objective, all become "joint and severally responsible., 30 5 The court mentioned
that even though the UN Charter does not explicitly include the right to
peace, the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO) lent support to the existence of the right in 1997.306
This treatment of the right to peace presents an interesting new angle
to transitional justice paradigms. The detailed presentation of the legal
doctrine underlying the right to peace suggests an intention to elevate it
beyond a mere political prerogative. If given equal standing with other
fundamental rights such as justice, the right to peace could trigger the
application of a proportionality test. If left as only a political aspiration,
the right to peace would lose out to more commonly recognized human
rights.
b. Relieving the Tension Between Peace and Justice
Colombia's Constitutional Court established that "justice does not
necessarily oppose peace," but rather the "administration of justice con299.
Gall6n Giraldo,Const'l Ct. Jgmt. No. C-370/2006, Expediente D-6032, at 277.
300.
Gustavo Gall6n Giraldo, Director y Representante Legal, Comisi6n Colombiana de
Juristas, Demanda de inconstitucionalidad contra la ley 975 de 2005, at 17 (on file with authors).
301.
Gall6n Giraldo,Const'i Ct. Jgmt. No. C-370/2006, Expediente D-6032, at 198.
302.
Id. at 200.
303.
Id. at 199.
304.
Carl Wellman, Solidarity, the Individual and Human Rights, 22 HUM. RTS. Q. 639,
642-43 (2000).
305.
Id. at 643.
306.
Gallrn Giraldo, Const'l Ct. Jgmt. No. C-370/2006, Expediente D-6032, at 199
(citing UNESCO Director-General, Report of the Director-Generalon the Human Right to
Peace, presented to the Secretary-Generaland the Minister of ForeignAffaris and Ministers of
Education of Member States, U.N. Doc. 29 C/59 (Oct. 29, 1997), available at http://
unesdoc.unesco.org/images/001 1/001100/1 10027e.pdf).
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tributes to peace because it resolves controversy and conflict through
institutional routes."3 °7 Even in viewing justice and peace as complementary principles, the court acknowledged that "in some occasions they are
in apparent tension in contexts of democratic transition and overcoming
armed conflict. In such contexts, it is necessary to provide penal benefits
to those who have committed grave human rights violations and humani3 8 The court recognized
tarian law infractions to overcome the conflict.""
that the express objective of Law 975/05 is to facilitate peace and the
reincorporation of combatants into civil life while also guaranteeing the
rights of victim-survivors, thus searching "for equilibrium between
peace and justice."3°9 Thus the rights to peace and justice are not contradictory but rather interdependent.30 Likewise, the Court also referred to
the preamble of the Joinet Principles, which recognizes that "there can
be no just and lasting reconciliation unless the need for justice is effectively satisfied.""'
The Court even made reference to the UN Secretary-General's 2004
report that characterized transitional justice as an extraordinary mechanism for administering justice when "normal" conditions do not exist
due to violent conflict.3 2 Still, the Court noted that "the social objectives
of peace" do not mean the state's international obligations to ensure
minimum standards of justice, truth, and reparations should be relaxed."3 '3 Here, the Court reinforced the adaptation of transitional justice
concepts to a situation of ongoing conflict, in effect making it a part of
the peace negotiations.
The Court also made explicit reference to human rights norms. It
outlined all the international human rights treaties to which Colombia is
a party and then dedicated an entire section to reviewing landmark cases
decided by the Inter-American Court.3 4 It explained that international

norms and jurisprudence are "relevant to the interpretation of rights and
duties in the internal order" and serve as "hermeneutic criteria" for
making sense of local constitutional norms.3 5 The Court sought a
balance between the instruments used to promote reconciliation and the
307.
Id. at 253.
Id.
308.
309.
Id. at 27.
310.
Id. at 26-27.
311.
Id. at 28-29 (citing Joinet Principles, supra note 43, pmbl.).
312.
Id. at 202 (citing Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-Generalon the Rule of
Law and TransitionalJustice in Conflict and Post-conflict Societies, 4, U.N. Doc S/2004/616
(Aug. 23, 2004)).
Id. at 202.
313.
Id. at 203-208.
314.
Id. at 208 (citing Godfnez Cruz vs. Honduras, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 5,
315.
224 (Jan. 20, 1989)).
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guarantee of the victims' rights in order to make "peace compatible with
human rights. 3 6 In this way, the merging of DDR with transitional
justice comes into focus.
c. Finding Balance: The Proportionality Test
In effect, the Constitutional Court's opinion established that neither
peace nor justice is an absolute right. The Court considered whether Law
975/05 is the most appropriate means for achieving the constitutionally
valid right to peace, or alternatively whether it institutionalizes a system
of impunity. Specifically, the Court applied a "method of deliberation" to
the tension between the claimants' rights and the legislative instruments
chosen by the state to transition towards peace and democracy. 7 The
goal was to harmonize the two values or determine which should have
prevalence.3 8 The Court emphasized that the legislative branch must operate within constitutional limits. In fact, Colombia's 1991 Constitution
itself was conceived as a "peace treaty," thus demonstrating that peace
carries great constitutional weight in Colombia.3 9 The Court explained
that the "novel problem presented by Law 975 of 2005 is how to deliberate on peace, ' 32 0 but it clarified that "peace does not justify everything."32 '
Indeed, "peace could be used to justify any type of measure, including
nugatory constitutional rights. ' 322 The Court therefore applied a proportionality test, ruling that the means chosen to effect peace must not
create a manifestly disproportionate effect on other constitutional
rights .323
d. Principal Holdings in Gall6n Giraldo
In Gall6n Giraldo the Constitutional Court refrained on procedural
grounds from considering some of the claims brought against Law
975/05.324 For instance, the Court declared itself unable to address the
petitioner's global criticism of a "system of veiled pardon and coveredup impunity," since this claim related to the general demobilization process, including Law 782/02 and Decree 128/03, on which the court did

316.
Id. at 241.
317.
Id. at 249.
318.
Id. at 250.
319.
Id. at 250, 252. For discussion of the 1991 Constitution, see Gabriel MurilloCastafio & Victoria Gfmez-Segura, Institutions and Citizens in Colombia: The Changing
Nature of a Difficult Relationship, 84 Soc. FORCES 1 (2005).
320.
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not have jurisdiction to rule on the merits.12' The Court also refused to
hear the petitioner's claim that if a victim does not invoke his right to
reparation during the proceedings, the right ceases to exist. The Court
felt that any opinion on the matter would amount to an interpretative
guideline, although it did offer such interpretation in other parts of the
opinion. The rulings relevant to our examination include the following
holdings:
The Alternative Sentence. While the Court acknowledged that limits
on acceptable punishment can lead to impunity, it explained that tools
for restoring peaceful coexistence may require flexibility when the goal
is disarmament.3 26 The Court rejected the notion that the alternative sentence is a "hidden pardon," since the original sentence does not expire
until all conditions are met: demobilization, reparations, time served, and
restraint from other criminal acts.327 The Court also rejected the allowance for accumulation of previous punishments in calculating the
32
The
alternative sentence, which amounted to a "disguised pardon.""

Court modified the prohibition on recidivism for the same crime that led
to conviction, making it apply to all illegal activity in the future and requiring complete resocialization and reinsertion.32 9 Failure to comply
leads to revocation of the benefits and reinstatement of the original conviction or criminal proceedings. In addition, the Court ruled that the
voluntary nature of participation in the concentration zones means that
time spent there cannot count toward a sentence, nor can the state effectively pardon participants by relaxing prison conditions.33 ° The Court

conceded, however, that the law would not apply retroactively to the
thousands of combatants demobilized under Law 782/02 and Decree
128/03.
Effective Investigation. While the Court did not find the time frame
for investigation unconstitutional, it eliminated the qualification that a
free confession immediately initiates the thirty-six-hour requirement for
holding an indictment hearing. Instead, it embraced a "reasonable timeframe" standard, during which the prosecutor can build a case.3' The
sixty-day limit for investigation comes into effect upon the indictment
hearing, rather than at the time of the confession itself.
Victim-Survivor Participation.The Court recognized the importance
of victim-survivor participation and set forth expectations for
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.

Id. at 257-58.
Id. at 201.
Id. at 266.
Id. at 269.
Id. at 270.
Id. at 306 (finding Article 31 to be unconstitutional).
Id. at 299.

Michigan Journalof InternationalLaw

[Vol. 28:49

participation at the following stages: free confession, indictment, and
acceptance of the charges.332 The Court explained that victims have an
implicit power to intervene in all phases of the proceedings.333 On the
question of standing, the Court adopted an inclusive view of "victims"
but noted that the "state is not obligated to assume all the damage of all
the family of direct victims." It also held that although not all family
members have the same rights, the law cannot impede their right to an
effective remedy. 334
The Right to Truth. The Court held that the law does not "design an
effective incentive system that promotes the full and accurate revelation
33 While
of truth.""
accepting the alternative sentence, the court found the
requirements for "collaborating with justice" too general to vindicate the
victim's right to truth.336 In addition, the Court required simply that information provided by the demobilized combatants be complete and
reliable, rejecting the requirement that a beneficiary's intent be determined whether or not a beneficiary denied, covered up, or was silent
about information. The Court found that because the law provided no
true incentive to tell the full truth, a more serious sanction for withholding information should apply.33 7 The more serious sanction would assist
in dismantling illegal armed groups by facilitating fuller inquiry into the
"macrocriminal phenomena" in Colombia. 338 Failure to provide the full

truth-or omitting truth-must trigger the state's legal responsibility to
investigate and sanction, resulting in subjection to the normal criminal
justice
system and making the "free confession" alternative a "one-shot
, ,339
deal.

The Court conceived of the right to truth as expansive, including
knowledge of the causes and circumstances of rights violations. The
Court also required that the location of the disappeared be part of the
information proffered. 340 Additionally, any limitation on access to ar-

chives would only be permissible to protect witnesses and victimsurvivors."4 The Court also annulled the sedition article based on proce-
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dural deficiencies in its enactment, essentially lifting any shield from
extradition.342
Reparations. The Court maintained the individual liability standard
for paying reparations, rejecting the notion that civil responsibility
should be passed on to the state, and thus to taxpayers "who have not
caused any damage but instead are victims of the macrocriminal process."3 43 The Court, however, required that all goods-not just those
considered illicit-be eligible for consideration in reparations payments,
although nonillicit goods would require a court order.3" Moreover, the
Court removed the phrase "if he or she has it" in reference to payment
into the Victims' Fund, eliminating financial hardship as a valid reason
for nonpayment.3'"
The Court also concluded that although penal responsibility remains
individualized, a form of vicarious liability, or "solidarity," extended to the
whole demobilized group.?" Still, the Court established a clear hierarchy
of responsibility, beginning with the demobilized. The state enters "in
this sequence only in a residual role to cover the rights of victims, especially those who do not have a final judicial decision to fix the amount of
indemnification. 3 47 The Court rejected limits in the budget as a reason
for failure to pay reparations, which "cannot be absolutely submitted to
the political will of those who define the budget, since the rights of victims must be satisfied, especially in the pursuit of peace and
reconciliation. 348 This ruling is significant in that states often claim that
limited resources circumscribe their obligation to pay reparations. 9
Even if the CNRR must temporarily allocate scarce resources, budget
constraints do not altogether extinguish the state's obligation to provide
some reparations.3 °
With regard to collective reparations, the Court warned that the
rights of individuals cannot be ignored, and again noted that the entire
group was liable under the notion of solidarity. The Court eliminated any
ambiguity about the need to identify the perpetrator to receive
342.
See Seagrave, supra note at 220 (citing IACHR, supra note 12, 74, which establishes that the conflict in Colombia is subject to international humanitarian law).
343.
Gall6n Giraldo, Const'l Ct. Jgmt. No. C-370/2006, Expediente D-6032, at 313.
344.
Id. at 320 (allowing all assets to be frozen pending proceedings, not just illegal
assets as provided for in Article 13(4)).
345.
Id. at 316.
346.
Id. at 335.
347.
Id. at 336; Law No. 975 of July 22, 2005, art. 42.2, O.G. No. 45.980, July 25, 2005
(Colom.).
348.
Galldn Giraldo, Const'l Ct. Jgmt. No. C-370/2006, Expediente D-6032, at 314.
349.
See generally Alexander Segovia, Financing Reparations Programs: Reflections
from International Experience, in THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS (Pablo de Greiff ed.,
2006).
350.
Gall6n Giraldo,Const'l Ct. Jgmt. No. C-370/2006, Expediente D-6032, at 330.
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reparations, since such a literal reading would amount to a
disproportionate burden on the victim."' The Court left open the issues
of how payment will be made in individual cases, as well as the criteria
for limiting these distributions. It also declined to interpret Article 55,
which makes the Social Solidarity Network responsible for distributing
reparations without further elaboration. The Court left the subject for
future decisions, clarifying
only that Article 54 places the burden for
3 52
reparations on combatants.

Definition of Victims. The Court adopted an inclusive view of victims, with the qualification that the "state is not obligated to assume all
the damage of all the family of direct victims." The Court also held that
not all the family members have "exactly the same rights," but that the
law cannot impede their right to an effective remedy.353
V. CONCLUSION

The Constitutional Court's decision in Gall6n Giraldo clearly indicates that DDR and transitional justice can no longer be separated
conceptually or practically. DDR programs must transcend the military
and security frameworks in which they have traditionally been conceived and must be located squarely within transitional justice debates
on truth, justice, reparations, and reconciliation.354 Rigorous respect for
human rights norms can change the legal and political climate in which
peace negotiations occur, meaning truth, justice, and redress should not
be ignored or indefinitely postponed.355 DDR programs therefore must
emphasize the "R" of DDR-reintegration, precisely the component
that has traditionally been the weakest link in the chain. This approach
would move beyond measures focused on how to give warring parties
an incentive to disarm and include the rights and demands of victimsurvivors and host communities.3 6
A reading of the Constitutional Court's opinion provides important
benchmarks for negotiating this "balancing act" between the desire for
peace-too frequently reduced to public order and issues of governability-and the observance of human rights. Proportionality means a
minimum baseline of respect for the fundamental rights of truth, jus351.
Id. at 336.
352.
Id. at 333.
353.
Id. at 328.
354.
See generally Theidon & Betancourt, supra note 7 (discussing the military aspects
of DDR in Colombia and the need for attention to local reconciliation processes).
355.
Miguel Ceballos & Gerard Martin, Colombia: Between Terror and Reform, Law &
Ethics, GEo. J. INT'L AFF., Summer/Fall 2001, at 87, 93.
356.
Id.
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tice, and reparations-the three basic pillars of transitional justicewhile upholding the "right to peace." Indeed, the Court clarified that all
these rights are interdependent, working synergistically; modifying one
right directly affects the others. Colombia is left searching for a "fit"
between two paradigms that are no longer legally or practically separable.
Undoubtedly, the challenges of this task contributed to the Court's
delay in publishing the ruling, which generated significant confusion
and tension. In the interim, the Court felt compelled to release a press
statement clarifying its key rulings in order to address the concerns of
both victim-survivors and paramilitaries. It reassured the paramilitaries
that previous convictions would accumulate under the maximum alternative sentence, and in turn assured the victim-survivors that an
original conviction would expire only once the beneficiary fulfilled all
conditions. In a sense, the judiciary entered into the peace negotiations,
brokering a compromise while maintaining its legal duty to champion
the rights and interests of the aggrieved.357 Victim-survivors are now a
third party to the peace negotiations.
While public debate continued on Law 975/05, President Uribe ordered the arrest of seventeen leaders of illegal armed groups. He also
ordered more than 30,000 of the individuals who were demobilized in
the last three years not to delay in invoking the special benefits of Law
975/05.358 Perhaps the potent combination of intense national and international protest forced the state to bring retributive justice into the
DDR mix.
Colombia's experience demonstrates that transitional justice is not
merely a legal phenomenon; rather, the mechanisms of transitional justice are also social phenomena, and an evaluation of their success will
depend in part upon the perceptions of members of the society undergoing transition from periods of violent conflict. As Teitel asserts, a
"genealogy of transitional justice demonstrates, over time, a close relationship between the type of justice pursued and the relevant limiting
political conditions. Currently, the discourse centers on preserving a
minimalist rule of law identified chiefly with maintaining peace.'' 35 9 She
opines that this trend presages an "increased pragmatism in the politicization of the law."36° Yet the case of Colombia presents almost the
357.
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opposite: the legalization of the political. These social and political forces
will play a direct role in the subsequent phases of both the transitional
justice and DDR processes in Colombia. The constantly evolving field of
transitional justice requires more than a study of legal debates and norms:
it requires an analysis of the cultural and political contexts that shape
what is legally and socially possible. With Colombia's transitional justice
process scheduled to proceed over the next eight years, this examination has only just begun.

